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Article

Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When
Judges Nullify Employer Liability in
Arbitrations
Michael H. LeRoy†
Identify the moral dilemma in the following scenario: responding to rising litigation costs1 and soaring liability from
employment lawsuits,2 a large company compels its employees
† Professor, School of Labor and Employment Relations, and College of
Law, at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Copyright © 2008 by
Michael H. LeRoy.
1. See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers
Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957–61 (2000) (providing
detailed empirical estimates of litigation costs). The minimum cost to litigate a
business claim is estimated at $100,000. Id. at 957. A typical bill to evaluate a
case and file a complaint is $6,000 if the stakes are under $150,000 and
$12,000 if they are over $2 million; the cost of an action for summary judgment is $18,000 or more. Id. at 958–59.
2. See Kathy Bergen & Carol Kleiman, Mitsubishi Will Pay $34 Million,
CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1998, at 1 (reporting that the car maker agreed to pay $34
million to settle a class action lawsuit claiming sexual harassment); Katherine
Bishop, California Women Receiving Millions To Settle Sex Bias Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1988, at A1 (reporting that State Farm Insurance Company
agreed to pay female employees up to $300 million to settle a sexdiscrimination lawsuit); Caren Chesler, Wall Street’s Catch-22: Its Managers
Keep Tripping over Their Own Feet in Female/Minority Hiring and Firing,
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Sept. 19, 2005, at 24, 27 (reporting that Morgan
Stanley settled an EEOC sex-discrimination lawsuit for $54 million in July
2004); Jim Fitzgerald, Anti-Bias Efforts, Payments to Blacks OK’d, CHI. SUNTIMES, Nov. 16, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Texaco agreed to spend $176.1 million to settle a race-discrimination suit); Mary B. Rogers & Kimberly A.
O’Sullivan, Image Discrimination: Is That Advertising Campaign Really Worth
It?, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2006, at 23, available at http://www
.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/November/23.pdf (reporting that Abercrombie
& Fitch paid $50 million in 2005 to settle a race-discrimination lawsuit, which
alleged that Hispanic, African American, and Asian employees were assigned
backroom duties during regular sales hours because they did not physically
match the company’s advertising models); Henry Unger, 17 Coke Class-Action
Parties Planning Individual Suits, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 7, 2001, at F3
(reporting that a judge approved Coca-Cola’s $192.5 million settlement of a
class action employment-discrimination lawsuit).
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to sign an agreement that waives their right to sue. The contract refers all disputes to binding arbitration, where both parties must pay equal forum fees.3 A clause in the agreement provides, however, for de novo court review of an arbitration
award—a ruling by the arbitrator.4
Eventually, an employee sues the company over a
workplace dispute. The court dismisses her lawsuit and orders
arbitration of her legal claims.5 The judge cites the Supreme
Court’s strong precedents favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.6 The arbitration agreement drafted by the employer names the provider of arbitration services and sets procedural rules for the private adjudication.7
After a hearing occurs, the arbitrator renders a ruling for
the employee. The award rules that the employer breached a
legal duty and orders large damages.8 Appealing the award to
court, the employer invokes the expanded review clause in the
arbitration agreement. The court vacates the award,9 leaving
3. E.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1232
(10th Cir. 1999) (noting that a janitor reluctantly signed an arbitration
agreement that made him pay half of the arbitrator’s fees and that he later
learned that to pursue his race and age discrimination claims, he had to make
a deposit of $6,000 to initiate the proceedings).
4. See, e.g., Hughes v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing
an arbitration agreement, which effectively provided that “[e]ither party may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . to vacate an arbitration award. However, in [these] actions . . . the standard of review to be applied to the arbitrator’s findings of fact and conclusions of law will be the same
as that applied by an appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.”).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. PSI Serv. II, Inc., No. Civ. A. 97-6749, 2001 WL
41122, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2001).
6. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (stating that by enacting the
FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration”).
7. Cf. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935–36 (4th Cir.
1999) (finding that the arbitration agreement had been drafted by the employer and making reference to other rules also drafted by the employer).
8. See, e.g., Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36
(6th Cir. 1996) (stating that an arbitrator found that an employer violated
state and federal discrimination laws and awarded back pay, attorney fees,
and reinstatement to a comparable position).
9. See, e.g., Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 498 (5th
Cir. 2004). A school principal who sued her employer, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII and whistleblower violations, was ordered by the court to
arbitrate her claim. Id. at 493. After she prevailed at arbitration and was
awarded $157,856.52, the school district went to federal court to vacate the
award. Id. at 494. The lower court denied the motion, but was reversed by the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 494–98. Judge Edith Jones ruled that
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the employee without access to a court and stuck with a useless
award that cost her thousands of dollars.
What is the moral dilemma here? The following are potential answers to this quandary:
1. The employer compelled its employee to forego access to
the courts, depriving her access to a jury trial.10
2. In substituting arbitration for a court, the employer took
advantage of its economic superiority by shifting forum costs to
the individual worker.11
3. There is no moral dilemma. The parties had a contract.
Although the employer drafted the agreement and took advantage of its superior bargaining power over the individual, this
arrangement was not so unfair as to void the contract under
the doctrine of adhesion.12 The employee received her end of the
bargain—and notably, she won.
4. The employer failed to take responsibility for the consequences of its own promise to substitute arbitration for a court.
By inserting a clause for expanded judicial review of the arbi“the parties intended judicial review to be available beyond the normal narrow
range of the FAA or MUAA.” Id. at 498. In vacating the district court’s order
confirming the arbitration award, she wryly noted, “[s]o much for saving money and relationships through alternative dispute resolution. Perfect justice is
not always found in this world.” Id. at 493.
10. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the
Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684
(1996) (“Large companies will also attempt to select a decision maker likely to
decrease their likely payout. One of the company’s chief goals in selecting arbitration over litigation is generally to avoid a jury trial.”).
11. Reginald Alleyne, Arbitrators’ Fees: The Dagger in the Heart of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Discrimination Claims, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) (“If the mandatory-arbitration agreement requires that
the employee and employer share the arbitrator’s fee, the employee may be
unable to afford it and other arbitration costs, as the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged.”); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1613 (2005) (“Others seem to have adopted a strategy
to raise the cost of proceedings so high that few claimants will dare to go forward.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Reducing the Presumption of Arbitrability, 22
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 460 (2004) (“[W]here they face likely high costs,
plaintiffs, specifically those with limited means, are unlikely to gamble their
food or housing money on the chance of a substantial arbitration award.”).
12. But see Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d
669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (holding that a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement was adhesive). “It was imposed on employees as a condition of employment and there was no opportunity to negotiate. . . . [T]he economic pressure exerted by employers . . . may be particularly acute, for the arbitration
agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few
employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.” Id.
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tration, the employer preserved “two bites at the apple” for itself when, ostensibly, the intent of the contract was to treat the
arbitrator’s decision as final and binding. Meanwhile, the employee was deprived a trial and was stuck with a useless arbitration award.
No answer is wrong. Rather, the right answer depends on
your perspective. If you chose the first answer, you would agree
with many commentators who criticize mandatory employment
arbitration.13 The second answer represents the consensus of
many judges,14 while others disagree.15 The third viewpoint is
widely approved by judges.16
13. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Normative Considerations of Employment
Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 393–94 (2006); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and
the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 1029, 1078–83 (2004); Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 521 (2006); Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding:
The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1711, 1778–79 (2006). But see, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—with Particular Consideration of Class
Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 252–53 (2006) (arguing that
enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits society by reducing
process costs, thereby benefitting consumers, employees, and other adhering
parties). See generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
1199 (2000); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the
Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1 (1996); Margaret M. Harding, The
Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 857; Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims
in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77 (1996); Martin H. Malin,
Privatizing Justice—but by How Much? Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589 (2001); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration
and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
395 (1999); George Nicolau, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: Its Ramifications and Implications for Employees, Employers and Practitioners, 1 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 177 (1998); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to
Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33; Sternlight, supra note 10, at
644–74; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1017 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and
Coercion under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999); Julian
J. Moore, Note, Arbitral Review (Or Lack Thereof ): Examining the Procedural
Fairness of Arbitrating Statutory Claims, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1572 (2000).
14. See, e.g., Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287
(11th Cir. 2001); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230,
1232–35 (10th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (“There is no doubt that parties appearing in federal court
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I have explored the perspectives underlying answers one,17
and three19 in my previous empirical studies of arbitration. In this Article, I launch a new approach—the moral hazard perspective in answer four—by using data on court review
of employment arbitration awards.
two,18

may be required to assume the cost of filing fees and other administrative expenses, so any reasonable costs of this sort that accompany arbitration are not
problematic. However, if an employee like Cole is required to pay arbitrators’
fees ranging from $500 to $1,000 per day or more in addition to administrative
and attorney’s fees, is it likely that he will be able to pursue his statutory
claims? We think not.” (citation omitted)). But see, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (stating a presumptive rule to enforce
cost-sharing obligations in arbitration agreements that involved poor individuals who are precluded from suing large corporations). The Court stated that
“[t]o invalidate the agreement on that basis would undermine the ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.’ It would also conflict with our
prior holdings that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving
that the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.” Id. (citation omitted)
(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
15. Id. at 26; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 5 (1995) (“[Employers’] concerns have recently increased as a result of (1) million dollar jury awards to employees and (2) the provision in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 that permits punitive damages in cases of intentional
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans With Disabilities Act.”).
16. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32–33
(1991) (“Mere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment
context.”). Many courts have echoed this view. See Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1377 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Although there is some
bargaining disparity here, as often in the employment context, the plaintiffs
have failed to show that the DRP and its making is so one-sided as to be unconscionable.”); Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004)
(“There was unquestionably a disparity in bargaining power, as Menards is a
large national company and Faber did not have the ability to negotiate and
change particular terms in the form contract. Mere inequality in bargaining
power does not make the contract automatically unconscionable.”); Cooper v.
MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2004) (“While the district court’s
compassion for job applicants is laudable, under its approach practically every
condition of employment would be an adhesion contract which could not be enforced because it would have been presented to the employee by the employer
in a situation of unequal bargaining power on a take it or leave it basis.”).
17. Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employees Are
Compelled to Waive Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 767–72 (2004).
18. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier
to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 143–44. (2002).
19. Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 573–81
(2005).
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Part I of this Article connects the idea of moral hazard to
employment arbitration, explaining that laws and social programs reduce personal incentives to avoid risks and arguing
that judicial review can serve as government insurance by relieving employers of liability for socially undesirable conduct.
Part II describes how individual employment arbitration
helps employers manage litigation costs, while simultaneously
disadvantaging some individuals.
Part III describes the complex web of standards that courts
use to review arbitration awards. I also demonstrate that common law standards for vacatur20 increasingly interfere with arbitration.
Part IV pinpoints four scenarios that often occur in conjunction with reversal of arbitrator rulings: courts find that the
arbitrator’s remedy is unauthorized or excessive; when courts
vacate awards, delay and litigation expenses grow large; vacatur is sometimes caused by arbitration agreements that embed
broad, judicial review standards; and state arbitration laws
tend to increase court interference with awards.
Part V is the heart of my study, consisting of research
methods and statistical findings, that identifies a disturbing
trend regarding court review of arbitration awards: state courts
vacated many arbitration wins for employees, but not for employers.
Part VI states that courts create moral hazard by vacating
a high percentage of employee wins at arbitration. I also propose two public policy changes to reduce moral hazard.
I. HOW DOES MORAL HAZARD APPLY TO EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION?
A. WHAT IS MORAL HAZARD? THE INSURANCE ORIGIN OF
MORAL HAZARD
Moral hazard is created by risk-sharing contracts or public
policies that discourage individuals from avoiding costly behaviors.21 When the insured has an incentive to act inappropriate20. Vacatur means a rule or order by which a proceeding is set aside.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1584 (8th ed. 2004).
21. For lawyers, a useful orientation to the subject appears in Tom Baker’s article, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). For
early studies that develop the moral-hazard idea, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941
(1963); Isaac Ehrlich & Gary S. Becker, Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and
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ly by exposing the insurer to the consequences of the insured’s
loss, moral hazard occurs.22
Consider the experience of nineteenth-century insurers.23
They recognized a potential hazard in allowing people to overinsure for a loss:24 an insured might create a loss and use insurance to come out ahead. This result might influence people
who “were unusually susceptible to the temptation that insurance can create.”25
Tom Baker’s study of Aetna’s Insurance Guide from the
1860s concluded that “the insured should never make money by
a loss. The contract should never be so arranged, that under
any circumstances it would be profitable to the insured to meet
with disaster. Any other arrangement is offering a premium for
carelessness and roguery.”26
Kenneth Arrow applied the concept of moral hazard to government-sponsored health insurance. Arrow concluded that the
entitlement might cause individuals to take less responsibility
for their own care.27 Current studies explore the government’s
role in causing people to fail to reduce their risk for unhealthy
behaviors. For instance, a tax code that allows individuals to
deduct medical expenses encourages less purchasing of private
health insurance policies. But private insurance reduces unhealthy behaviors because people pay more as their risks increase.28 State laws that require health insurance to cover alSelf-Protection, 80 J. POL. ECON. 623 (1972); John M. Marshall, Moral Hazard,
66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); Mark V. Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J.
ECON. 44 (1974); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1968); Richard Zeckhauser, Medical Insurance: A
Case Study of the Tradeoff Between Risk Spreading and Appropriate Incentives, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 10 (1970).
22. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure
Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INS. 4, 6 (1983)
(“[T]he more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency,
the less incentive individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less
they bear the full consequences of their actions.”); see also Amitai Aviram, The
Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 54, 94 (2006).
23. Baker, supra note 21, at 251.
24. Id. at 250.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Arrow, supra note 21, at 961–63.
28. Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and
Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1486–87 (1991).
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cohol abuse have seen higher rates of consumption compared to
states that do not insure for this risk.29 Apart from insuring
personal losses, government programs create moral hazard by
making individuals pay less for their losses.30
Other forms of publicly funded insurance create moral hazard. The federal flood insurance program pays property owners for failing to avoid known risks, such as building homes in
the path of hurricanes.31 Storm insurance creates moral hazard
when it fails to relocate vulnerable populations to safer areas
after a devastating event.32 Federal bank deposit insurance has
a similar effect. It reduces lending costs for banks, thereby
making credit easier to obtain and enabling banks to make
riskier loans.33
B. MORAL HAZARD IN EMPLOYMENT-BASED INSURANCE
Widespread use of insurance in the employment relationship creates possibilities for moral hazards. Certain pensions,
called defined benefit plans, promise employees an automatic
stream of retirement income. To protect retirees from the loss
of this benefit, Congress created a pension insurance corporation.34 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) insures
against losses by taxing employers.35 Moral hazard occurs when
companies continue to make future pension obligations while
they underfund current contributions.36

29. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing Addiction: Do
State Health Insurance Mandates Increase Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 175, 186–87 (2006).
30. See Eric D. Beal, Posner and Moral Hazard, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 81, 85
(2001) (postulating that the moral hazard inherent in many forms of insurance
is mitigated through devices like copayments, deductibles, limits, and insurance ratings, which pass a part of the cost back to the insured, providing a
partial incentive to minimize risk).
31. Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1605, 1654 n.160 (2007).
32. Id. at 1654.
33. Rajeev Dehejia & Adriana Lleras-Muney, Financial Development and
Pathways of Growth: State Branching and Deposit Insurance Laws in the
United States, 1900–1940, 50 J.L. & ECON. 239, 243–44 (2007).
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). The PBGC was modeled
after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,950
(1974) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
36. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 65, 107 (explaining that companies have an incentive to
spend capital in ways other than funding pension plans).
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Similarly, workers’ compensation laws insure employees
for lost income and medical expenses from on-the-job injuries.37
These laws also create indirect insurance for employers by extinguishing tort liability for causing an injury.38 Workers’ compensation laws require employers to purchase insurance or selfinsure to pay employee claims.39 Like other insurance systems,
workers’ compensation may create incentives for individuals to
avoid the financial consequences of a lost-time injury.40 A
worker might prolong her leave of absence beyond the endpoint
of medical necessity because the insurance fund essentially
pays her to remain idle.41
Employers also face moral hazard in that they may fail to
reduce risky behaviors by relying on insurance to pay for
avoidable accidents. In Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries,42 an
employer ordered workers to speed production on power saws
and removed safety guards.43 Later, an employee sawed off two
fingers.44 When other workers were similarly hurt, the employer callously dismissed their concerns, stating that claimants
were paid for their loss.45
C. A THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AWARDS
The implications of moral hazard studies are significant for
my empirical investigation of employment arbitration awards. I
equate employment arbitration agreements to insurance contracts for employers. These contracts manage two general risks
for employers: the high cost of trials and related litigation46 and
liability for wrongdoing.47

37. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE
AND MATERIALS 908–09 (5th ed. 2003).

LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES

38. Id. at 958–59.
39. Id. at 909.
40. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 684–90 (1998). Examples include
injured workers who use compensation benefits to prolong their leave, and
noninjured workers who file fraudulent lost-time claims. Id.
41. Id. at 817.
42. 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
43. Id. at 915.
44. Id. at 915–16.
45. Id.
46. See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 957–60.
47. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001).

LEROY_mlr

2009]

3/15/2009 5:49 PM

EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN ARBITRATIONS

1007

My theory focuses on employer expenses for liability. In the
1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress authorized courts to order
make-whole relief and punitive damages for victims of intentional employment discrimination.48 By enacting Title VII,
lawmakers also forced employers to self-insure for the societal
harm that results from workplace discrimination.49 The point is
that employment discrimination laws can be compared to insurance. By making employers pay for their discrimination,
Congress hoped to diminish the spillover costs to the nation’s
economy when minorities are excluded from the workforce.
Lawmakers could have appropriated funds to hire government lawyers to enforce Title VII. Instead, a provision in the
law authorizes courts to order employers to pay a prevailing
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.50 This law creates more incentive for
employers to avoid liability because private attorney’s fees can
be high.51 As a result, more employers should want to reduce
risks associated with Title VII liability.
Let us now consider government regulation of employment
arbitration. When Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.52
broadly approved arbitration as a substitute for trials, the Supreme Court promised that by “agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party [would] not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute. . . .”53 Gilmer states a theory of forum
substitution. Arbitrators serve as substitute judges. The theory
48. When Congress increased employer penalties for employment discrimination, lawmakers reasoned: “Monetary damages are also necessary to make
discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their
mental and emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity.” Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 206(A), 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1) (2000) (“In an action brought by a complaining
party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination . . . the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages.” (internal citation
omitted)).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (“In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”).
51. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
52. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
53. Id. at 26; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
15(“[Employers’] concerns have recently increased as a result of (1) million dollar jury awards to employees and (2) the provision in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 that permits punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans With Disabilities Act.”).
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implies that when arbitrators determine that evidence supports
a finding of employer liability, they should provide the relief
that a judge would order.
Let us now assume that the arbitrator performs this role,
but the employer refuses to accept the financial consequences of
its wrongdoing. When a court vacates the arbitrator’s ruling in
favor of the employee, forum substitution is undermined.
Therefore, employers use vacatur courts to counteract the
negative effects of risky behaviors just as home owners and
beachfront developers use federal disaster insurance. These
parties seek government intervention to bail them out of the
consequences of risky behaviors that turn costly. The moral hazard model indicates that vacatur courts act as government insurers by relieving employers of liability for socially undesirable conduct.
I postulate that employers enter into employment arbitration agreements because they perceive arbitration as a better
forum. Through arbitration, they can avoid the growing cost of
court procedures and rulings.54 Also, employers exploit their
superior knowledge of information about these contracts.55 A
typical clause states that an arbitrator’s award shall be final
and binding. I hypothesize that an employee would be more
likely than an employer to take this language at face value and
be deterred from challenging an adverse ruling.56 As a more informed party, however, an employer realizes that it has re54. See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 957–61 (noting the high recent estimates of litigation costs).
55. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the
Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 223–24 (1998) (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves”
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95, 97–110 (1974)) (noting the numerous advantages that repeat players
have over one-shotters in litigation). My theory is based on the idea that “repeat players have strategic superiority in that they can structure a transaction
to their advantage.” Id. at 233.
56. See Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract,
13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 261–62 (2002) (analyzing research that shows a
high percentage of literate adults who are unable to extract pertinent information from form contracts); id. at 266 (“[T]he legal system is engaging in the fiction of a free and informed market, while turning a blind eye to the realities of
the marketplace and to the fact that consumers cannot understand and do not
actually assent to the terms of the consumer contracts they sign.”); see also
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1631, 1654–55 (2005) (showing that employees find it difficult and expensive to challenge an arbitration clause in court, and that the extra legal
hurdle of mandatory arbitration makes it harder for employees to retain an
attorney).
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course to challenge an award in court. Furthermore, depending
on language in the arbitration agreement, an employer can improve its odds of overcoming the presumption of award finality—and achieve an outcome that allows the employer to avoid
liability for wrongdoing.57
These liability avoidance tactics vary. Some contracts provide for de novo review of an arbitrator’s award.58 These
agreements are contradictory. They preclude an employee’s
access to courts and treat arbitrator awards as final and binding. But they preserve access to courts for the purpose of appealing an award, and furthermore, they allow judges to conduct a de novo review of the arbitrator’s ruling. The result:
employers have two separate adjudications to avoid liability.
In another award-avoidance tactic, some employers draft a
favorable choice-of-law provision.59 Parties can review awards
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)60 or state arbitration
law equivalents.61 More states are expanding grounds for challenging an arbitrator’s award.62 By choosing a state law that
facilitates judicial nullification of awards, employers can improve their odds of avoiding liability.63
57. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding that parties may contractually modify the standard of review of an arbitration award); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d
287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that contracting parties can opt out of the
FAA’s default vacatur standards); Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588,
592–93 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that parties may structure the standard of review for arbitration awards as they see fit); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland,
No. 96-2261, 1997 WL 452245, at *5 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (noting that any
doubt about the scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor
of arbitration); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th
Cir. 1996) (noting that arbitration agreements may specify the jurisdiction for
enforcement); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774–
75 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that there is a circuit split on whether parties can
contractually expand the judicial standard of review of an arbitration award
and concluding that they cannot).
58. E.g., Harris, 286 F.3d at 794 (concluding that in the Fifth Circuit, a de
novo standard of review will be applied to questions of law decided by arbitrators).
59. E.g., Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 257 F.3d at 294 (involving an arbitration agreement that was to be governed by New York state law).
60. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
61. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 497 (1956);
see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2006).
62. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000); Am. Arbitration Ass’n, RUAA and UMA Legislation from Coast to Coast, DISP. RESOLUTION TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
63. E.g., Prescott v. Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 493–94 (5th
Cir. 2004) (involving an employer’s arbitration agreement that incorporated
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I now connect this theoretical framework to my empirical
investigation. If courts enforced a very high percentage of
awards—let us suppose 100%—no moral hazard would be
created. The employer would bear the consequences of its behavior by paying damages every time for its unlawful behavior.
Suppose, however, that courts vacated most awards that order
employers to pay for their liability. The employee would lose
the benefit of the bargain for final and binding arbitration. Also, because Gilmer requires courts to enforce arbitration
agreements, the employee would have no recourse in court. The
employer would avoid liability that was determined by an arbitrator. The vacatur court would insure employers from paying
for their liability.
How would this situation compare to other models of moral
hazard? As in the general insurance model, a contract would
tempt one party (an employer) to avoid the full consequences of
its actions and to act inappropriately by exposing another party
(an employee) to the injurious effects of its misconduct.64
As a result, employers would be less deterred to engage in
risky behaviors that create liability, compared to the case
where the employer would be required to pay.65 The arbitration
agreement would, in effect, create a temptation that “[brings]
out the bad in otherwise good people.”66
I note an important caveat. Proof of moral hazard would
require evidence that an employer’s avoidance of liability in arbitration actually caused this party to fail to take future precautions to avoid the same risk.67 For example, an employer
who vacated an award that remedied sexual harassment would
fail to learn from the experience and continue to tolerate sexual
harassment in its workplace. My empirical study does not
measure employer responses to court rulings that vacate proworker awards.

the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act, even though parties were located in
Louisiana).
64. See Stiglitz, supra note 22 (“[T]he more and better insurance that is
provided against some contingency, the less incentive individuals have to
avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences of
their actions.”).
65. See Aviram, supra note 22 (“[T]hird-party actions that reduce a risk to
an individual may create an incentive for the individual to take fewer precautions against the same risk . . . .”).
66. Baker, supra note 21, at 251.
67. See Beal, supra note 30, at 85–86.
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II. EMPLOYER MOTIVATION TO USE ARBITRATION:
MANAGING THE RISK OF LIABILITY OR SEEKING A
BETTER ADR PROCESS?
Consider, again, the Aetna insurance model.68 Aetna assumed that allowing people to buy excess insurance would induce people who “were unusually susceptible to the temptation
that insurance can create” to engage in fraudulent activities for
profit.69 The Aetna model assumed that some people would succumb to “carelessness and roguery.”70 Thus, Aetna wrote insurance contracts to make it impossible for anybody to come out
ahead by claiming a loss.
By analogy, I theorize that some employers take a rogue’s
approach to the contractual promise to treat arbitration awards
as final and binding. They use courts to insure against a loss.
When courts are too permissive in relieving their fault, rogue
employers are rewarded for failing to take responsibility for
their own misconduct.
Another phenomenon that is important to consider in light
of this moral hazard problem is the recent explosion of employment arbitration. I examine why employers prefer arbitration to courts since there has been no visible evidence of employee preference for arbitration over courts. There are two
schools of thought on this subject.
The “dark side,” as examined in Part II.A, is that employers prefer arbitration because it manages their risk of liability
for unlawful conduct. In particular, arbitration creates process
disadvantages for employees. Therefore, the odds of employer
liability are lower as compared to the civil court system. Even if
arbitration produces a good outcome for the individual, judicial
review of awards creates “two bites at the apple” for the employer.
The “bright side,” as examined in Part II.B, looks at how
inaccessible courts are due to cost, delay, and over-emphasis on
procedural manoeuvring. Arbitration holds real promise of an
adjudicatory hearing for ordinary individuals because of its
lower cost and simplicity. Moreover, studies show that arbitration is providing positive outcomes for many employees.

68. Baker, supra note 21, at 250; see supra Part I.A.
69. Baker, supra note 21, at 250.
70. Id. (citing AETNA GUIDE TO FIRE INSURANCE FOR THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ATENA INSURANCE CO. 157 (1867)).
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A. THE DARK SIDE OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MANAGING
THE RISK OF LIABILITY BY CREATING PROCESS DISADVANTAGES
FOR EMPLOYEES
For more than a century, the doctrine of employment-atwill defined American employment law, allowing either the
employer or individual to terminate the work relationship at
any time, for any reason.71 However, fundamental changes in
government regulation of employment during the 1960s altered
this arrangement. Congress passed sweeping employment discrimination laws.72 In the same period, state courts developed
common law exceptions to employment at will.73
As the field of employment law expanded, so did employer
liability. A critical threshold was reached when courts applied
tort theories and remedies to workplace disputes, including the
public policy exception to employment-at-will74 and related
whistleblower protection,75 emotional distress,76 assault and

71. See H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 134 (1877) (“With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. . . . [I]t is an indefinite
hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this respect there
is no distinction between domestic and other servants.”).
72. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78
Stat. 214, 255–57 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 206 & 50 U.S.C. 781
(2000)) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”); S. REP. NO. 88-872, pt. 1, at 11 (1964), as
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2365 (“[A] total of 32 [states] now protect
against discrimination and segregation in public accommodations and facilities.”); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 1, at 18 (1963), as reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 (“Considerable progress has been made in eliminating discrimination in many areas because of local initiative . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974)
(finding covenant of good-faith-dealing exception to employment-at-will); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (finding a public-policy exception to employment-at-will).
74. E.g., Harless v. First Nat’l, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W.Va. 1978) (holding
that the discharge of an employee who tried to convince his employer to comply with the consumer credit laws violated a clear public policy of protecting
consumers); O’Sullivan v. Mallon, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1978) (holding that employer had no at-will right to discharge an x-ray technician who refused to perform catheterizations because it would have been illegal for this employee to perform the procedure).
75. E.g., Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1061 (Cal. 1998).
76. E.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1142 (5th Cir.
1991) (applying Texas law to an emotional-distress claim); Bustamento v.
Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 538 (La. 1992) (noting that intentional infliction of
emotional distress can occur in the workplace).
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battery in severe cases of sexual harassment,77 negligence,78
and defamation.79 State constitutions compounded this trend
by creating privacy rights for workers.80
In the early 1990s, two critical streams in employment law
were joined. The 1991 Civil Rights Act81 and Americans with
Disabilities Act in 199282 posed a liability threat to employers.
Employment discrimination lawsuits in federal courts doubled
in five years, as filings soared from 8273 in 1990 to 19,059 in
1995.83 To put this trend in perspective, consider that employment claims, including those under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, comprised about fifty-two percent of all civil rights
cases filed in federal courts in 1995.84
The 1991 amendments expressly allowed discrimination
victims to recover up to $300,000 in punitive damages.85 This
supplemented the strong remedial provisions in Title VII.86 Al77. E.g., Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997).
78. E.g., Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight, Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1089
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
79. E.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 892
(Minn. 1986).
80. E.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 89 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (concluding that the California constitution protects employees’
right to privacy).
81. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
82. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
83. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DIST. COURT CASES: JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, CIVIL CASES FILED BY NATURE OF SUIT 2 tbl.4.4
(2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/2006/Table404.pdf.
84. Id. (citing 36,600 “Civil Rights” cases in federal courts in 1995, of
which 19,059 were “Employment” cases).
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (2000) (specifying the compensatory
and punitive damages available under Title VII).
86. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 532 U.S. 843, 852 (2001)
(explaining the expansion of Title VII remedies). When Congress originally
conceived section 706(g) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, it authorized courts to
enjoin intentional acts of discrimination and order make-whole-type remedies
(e.g., back pay), similar to those under the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at
848–50. Congress broadened judicial power to remedy intentional acts of discrimination in 1972 because courts could not always provide effective relief.
Id. at 849–50. But some acts of discrimination make reinstatement an unworkable remedy. Thus, front pay—ongoing financial relief until a plaintiff
finds equivalent employment at another workplace—is also authorized in section 706(g). Id. at 850. When Congress revisited the remedy issue in 1991, it
“determined that victims of employment discrimination were entitled to additional remedies.” Id. at 852. Thus, Congress authorized “the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previously available remedies,
such as front pay.” Id. at 854. The result is that an employer who commits in-
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so, the total cost of remedies in the 1991 law exceeds the facial
limit of $300,000 for compensatory damages. Pollard v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. demonstrates the point.87 After finding
that a female worker experienced flagrant discrimination, the
district court awarded her $107,364 in back pay and benefits,
$252,997 in attorney’s fees, and $300,000 in compensatory
damages.88
The trial court said that it wanted to award more in compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991—based
on the fact that Sharon Pollard could not return to her former
job because of a severe and continuing hostile work environment—but declined to award future damages because the court
believed that the law’s cap on “future pecuniary loss” also applied to front pay.89 The Supreme Court ruled, however, that
front pay did not count against the $300,000 limit.90 On remand, the trial court awarded Pollard approximately $2.2 million in compensatory damages (for back pay, front pay, and infliction of emotional distress) and $2.5 million in punitive
damages on the emotional distress claim.91 Pollard shows that
Title VII is costly for employers.
A second stream in employment law emerged in 1991 with
the Supreme Court’s strong approval of mandatory arbitration
for an age discrimination claim in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson

tentional acts of discrimination may be ordered to pay tort-like damages, and
in addition, be subject to the equitable remedies of back pay and front pay.
87. 532 U.S. 843, 845 (2001).
88. Id. As the only female worker in her department, Pollard was shunned
by male employees who believed that the Bible teaches that women must totally submit to men. In addition, she was constantly subjected to derogatory
terms regarding women, including “‘bitches,’ ‘cunts,’ ‘heifers,’ and ‘split tails.’”
Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 938 (6th Cir. 2000),
rev’d, 532 U.S. 843 (2001). The men also sabotaged Pollard’s work. Id. Pollard
felt threatened after her tires were slashed and male coworkers provoked confrontations with her. Id. at 939–40. Eventually, she went on a disability leave
that DuPont’s psychologist approved. Id. at 941. When DuPont’s plant management could not guarantee that she would not be assigned to work with
these men, she again refused to return, prompting DuPont to fire her. Id.
89. Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924 n.19
(W.D. Tenn. 1998) (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) limits compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII to $300,000 and that the statute
defines the former element as “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.”).
90. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 853–54.
91. Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 412 F.3d 657, 666 (6th Cir.
2005), aff’g, 338 F. Supp. 2d 865 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
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Lane Corp.92 Gilmer held that an employee who had been required by his employer to sign an arbitration agreement was
precluded from suing in court.93 The ruling gave employers
hope for curtailing their expanding liability. More recently, the
Court’s ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams94 expanded
Gilmer.
These oddly conjoined streams encouraged employers to
use arbitration agreements to bypass courts in hopes of lowering the cost of employment disputes.95 In a late-1990s national
survey, most Fortune 1000 companies reported that they use
employment arbitration.96 Ninety percent said that they
adopted an ADR method as a “critical cost technique.”97 Commentators concluded that adoption of arbitration enabled employers to limit litigation risks and costs.98 The trend is reflected today in arbitration procedures that allow employers to

92. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (listing prior cases where the court has enforced
arbitration agreements).
93. See id. at 26–27. This ruling is synonymous with the expression
“mandatory arbitration.” In mandatory arbitration, one party conditions a contractual benefit or entitlement—for example, employment or use of a credit
card—on the other party’s agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration instead of going to court. Because the arbitration clause is a nonnegotiable condition for the contractual relationship, it is called mandatory.
94. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (ruling that all employment arbitration
agreements are enforceable under the FAA, with the exception of a small sliver of agreements that cover transportation workers).
95. See Ken May, Arbitration: Attorney Urges Employers to Adopt Mandatory Programs as Risk Management, DAILY LAB. REP. (WASH., D.C.), May 14,
2001, at A-5 (“The major advantages of mandatory arbitration, Copus observed, are to limit damages and eliminate class actions. The real risk of litigation, he said, is from tort claims in which a single plaintiff can get millions
of dollars. Arbitration programs should cap damages, he said, adding that he
suggests capping damages at the limit of a Title VII claim.”).
96. See Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR
as Alterative to Litigation, Survey Says, DAILY LAB. REP., May 14, 1997, at A-4
(“The survey found that over the last three years . . . 79 percent [of employers]
have used arbitration.”).
97. Id.
98. See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Patterns of ADR Use in Corporate Disputes, 54 DISP. RESOL. J. 66, 71 (1999) (“All else being equal, ADR is
widely considered cheaper and faster . . . .”); Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance
Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3
(1997) (“For many employers, managing this risk of liability is a vital part of
their human resources mission and an important part of their general corporate cost-control program.”); cf. Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”:
Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1301 (1998) (“[T]he business world has become
enamored with ADR.”).
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manage risk by “eliminat[ing] the jury trial, class actions, and
large attorney’s fees . . . .”99
Specific cases lend support for the risk-management thesis.
Arbitration agreements require workers to waive their right to
sue100 and to replace a court with arbitration.101 Often, workers
cannot bargain over this forum.102 Companies create their own
justice rules to shield themselves from stricter enforcement.103
Prehearing risk-control tactics include limits on discovery,104
shorter periods to file claims,105 selection of arbitrators without
employee input,106 and inconvenient venues.107 Some employers
not only bar access to courts, but they also deter employee
99. Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR.
L. REV. 861, 862 (2004); see also David S. Schwartz, Understanding RemedyStripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 53 (2003) (contending that employers use arbitration as a risk-management device).
100. See, e.g., Baldeo v. Darden Rests., Inc., No. 04-CV-2185(JG), 2005 WL
44703, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2005).
101. See, e.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 146 (2d
Cir. 2004).
102. See, e.g., Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 380
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
103. See DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING
WORKPLACE CONFLICT 103 tbl.3.11 (2003) (reporting that 36.9% of employers
indentified “avoids legal precedents” and that 59.3% of employers identified
“has limited discovery” as reasons for using arbitration).
104. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31
(1991) (“Although those procedures might not be as extensive as in the federal
courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party ‘trades the procedures and opportunity of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985))).
105. See, e.g., Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
2005) (ruling that arbitrator had authority to rule on validity of sixty-day filing requirement); Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 726–27 (9th
Cir. 2000) (holding that because ERISA provides a four-year statute of limitations for an action to recover benefits under a written contract, the plan administrator breached its fiduciary duty by adopting a mandatory arbitration
clause that set a sixty-day time limit in which to demand arbitration); Louis v.
Geneva Enter., 128 F. Supp. 2d 912, 917 n.2 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that a
sixty-day filing limit in arbitration agreement drafted by the employer unlawfully conflicted with three-year statute of limitations for Fair Labor Standards
Act claims).
106. See, e.g., Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938 (4th Cir. 1999)
(“Given the unrestricted control that one party (Hooters) has over the panel,
the selection of an impartial decision maker would be a surprising result.”).
107. See, e.g., Poole v. L.S. Holding, Inc., No. 2001-57, 2001 WL 1223748, at
*1 (D.V.I. 2001) (rejecting contention by Virgin Islands employee that Massachusetts is a prohibitively expensive venue to arbitrate claim).

LEROY_mlr

2009]

3/15/2009 5:49 PM

EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN ARBITRATIONS

1017

access to arbitration by requiring employees to pay large forum
costs associated with the hearing process.108
Once the arbitrator has been appointed and the hearing
commences, additional risk management controls may still be
in place. Some arbitration agreements bar class actions.109
They may include remedial limits on statutory claims110 and
strictures against punitive damages in awards.111
The arbitration agreement may also anticipate a finding
adverse to the employer. As an additional risk control, the
agreement may authorize the losing party to appeal the arbitrator ruling and seek expanded review of the award.112 Such a
provision is intended to circumvent highly deferential court re-

108. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“The default cost-splitting rule in the Circuit City arbitration
agreement would deter a substantial percentage of potential litigants from
bringing their claims in the arbitral forum.”).
109. See, e.g., Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646
(S.D.W. Va. 2001) (“[P]laintiff has entered into a valid contract to arbitrate
any employment related issue thereby waiving his right to proceed as a part of
a class action . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 827
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (upholding $162,000 limit imposed by arbitration agreement
although Title VII permits up to $300,000 in punitive damages).
111. See, e.g., Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 225 (3d
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he Agreement provided that the arbitrator could not award punitive or exemplary damages.”).
112. See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Award of the Arbitrator shall be binding on the parties hereto, although each party shall retain his right to appeal any questions of law,
and judgment may be entered thereon in any court having jurisdiction.”);
Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Either party
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction . . . to vacate an arbitration award. . . . [T]he standard of review to be applied to the arbitrator’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be the same as that applied by an
appellate court reviewing a decision of a trial court sitting without a jury.”);
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[The
Agreement] contains a generic choice-of-law clause, stating that it ‘shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.’”); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL
452245, at *15 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (“[A]rbitrator shall not have the power
to commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award may be vacated or
corrected by judicial review for any such error.”); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Mich., 103 F.3d 35, 36 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that agreement provided for judicial review of the arbitration award “as established by law” and
for the arbitrator’s “clear error of law”); Bargenquast v. Nakano Foods, Inc.,
243 F. Supp. 2d 772, 774 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“The arbitrator . . . shall have no
power, in rendering the award, to alter or depart from any express provision of
this Agreement or to make a decision which is not supported by law and substantial evidence.”).
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view of arbitration awards. In effect, these employers seek a “do
over” of the arbitration.
B. THE BRIGHT SIDE OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: A BETTER
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM COMPARED TO COURTS
Arbitration has advantages in terms of cost, time,
precedent, and privacy as compared to trials.113 Some employers use arbitration in a broader context. As corporations, they
seek to limit liability in all transactions and disputes, including
those that arise in the employment relationship.114
Employer preference for arbitration is better understood
with historical context. For over three hundred years, businesses have found courts to be unwieldy and expensive forums
in which to resolve disputes. In response to businesses that
were dissatisfied with public tribunals, an English statute of
1697 authorized courts to enforce arbitration awards.115 Economists in the 1600s favored arbitration because courts wasted
time and money.116 Under Lord Mansfield’s influence, English
commercial law deferred to arbitration rulings.117
113. See ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
600–01 (3d ed. 2002) (concluding that arbitration allows parties to select their
own decisionmaker, proceed to a hearing relatively quickly, dispense with tediously formal rules, and reduce the friction that accompanies trials); Frank
E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A UserFriendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 55 tbl.1
(1994) (showing likelihood that ADR will overcome impediments to settlement).
114. See Sternlight, supra note 10, at 680 (“The profit maximizing company
will attempt to draft a dispute resolution contract so as to maximize its profits
and minimize its losses. The company will seek an agreement that will minimize the likelihood of having any claims made against it at all. In addition,
where claims are to be brought, the company will attempt to minimize both its
own transaction costs of engaging in dispute resolution and the cost of the actual payout upon loss of a claim to a consumer.”).
115. An Act for Determining Differences by Arbitration, 1697, 9 & 10 Will.
3, c. 15 (Eng.) (“Now for promoting trade, and rendering the awards of arbitrators the more effectual in all cases, for the final determination of controversies
referred to them by merchants and traders, or others, concerning matters of
account or trade, or other matters; be it enacted . . . .”). John Locke’s role in
formulating the statute is documented in Henry Horwitz & James Oldham,
John Locke, Lord Mansfield and Arbitration During the Eighteenth Century,
36 THE HIST. J. 137, 138–39 (1993).
116. See, e.g., JOSIAH CHILD, A NEW DISCOURSE OF TRADE 141–44 (4th ed.
1745). Child’s chapter, “Concerning a Court Merchant,” said that “this Kingdom will at length be blessed with a happy method, for the speedy, easy, and
cheap deciding of differences between Merchants, Masters of Ships, and seamen by some Court or Courts of Merchants . . . .” Id. at 141. He complained
that conventional litigation in courts of law entailed “tedious attendance and
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This view was shared by nineteenth-century American
courts that upheld arbitration agreements. A New York court
ruled in 1832 that “[a]wards are much favored, and the court
will intend everything in their favor.”118 In rejecting a challenge to an award, the court was troubled that a cost-saving
process could be overturned by a subsequent and expensive trial.119
Early in the twentieth century, businesses complained that
courts were costly and inefficient providers of commercial justice. Thus, in 1925 Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act120 (and renamed it the Federal Arbitration Act in
1947121) to help businesses reduce expense and delay in resolving their legal disputes.122 Congress learned from businesses
that too many courts refused to enforce their private arbitration agreements.123 Thus, a national arbitration law with federal jurisdiction was proposed.124
vast expenses.” Id. at 142.
117. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, LORD MANSFIELD 104–05 (1936) (“The collaboration of judge and merchant, if it was to exercise its due influence upon the law,
required adequate channels of communication. In the development of the special jury Lord Mansfield found the vital medium. . . . Lord Mansfield converted
an occasional into a regular institution and trained a corps of jurors as a permanent liaison between law and commerce.”).
118. Campbell v. Western, 3 Paige 124, 128 n.1 (N.Y. Ch. 1832).
119. See id. at 138 (“If every party who arbitrates, in relation to a contested
claim, to save trouble and expense, is to be subjected to a chancery suit, and to
several hundred dollars cost, if the arbitrators happen to err upon a doubtful
question as to the admissibility of a witness, the sooner these domestic tribunals of the parties’ own selection are abolished the better. Such a principle is
wholly inconsistent with common sense, and cannot be the law of a court of
equity.”).
120. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
121. See Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (amending the
United States Arbitration Act) (codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)).
122. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (stating that the FAA was proposed to help businesses “avoid the delay and expenses of litigation”); H.R.
REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (asserting that Congress believed that the simplicity of arbitration would “reduc[e] technicality, delay, and [keep] expense to a
minimum and at the same time safeguard[ ] the rights of the parties”).
123. See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings on S.
1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 8 (1924) [hereinafter Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:
Hearings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman, Comm. on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York).
124. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (“The purpose of this bill is to make valid
and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction o[f ] admiralty, or which may be
the subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”).
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Business leaders complained that lawsuits led to “ruinous
litigation”125 and hurt American consumers because firms had
to pass along litigation costs in their prices.126 Companies
avoided these problems when they voluntarily submitted their
disputes to arbitration.127 Arbitration offered “the best means
yet devised for an efficient, expeditious, and inexpensive adjustment of . . . disputes.”128
Today, employers voice similar concerns about courts.
When Congress studied arbitration in 1997, its survey found
that nearly one in five employers used arbitration.129 Companies said that arbitration reduced “employment-related litigation.”130 Also, a case study of mandatory arbitration found that
a large company and its employees mutually benefited from the
method.131 Other studies show that arbitration reduced legal
fees.132
Besides promoting efficiency and cost savings, employergenerated arbitration systems produced surprisingly positive
results for claimants. A comparison of trials in the federal court
in New York City and nearby arbitrations held by NASD and
NYSE found that discrimination complainants fared better in
125. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note
123, at 6.
126. See id. (“The litigant’s expenses—that is, whatever is necessary to
cover the annual outlay for litigation or the fear of litigation, consultations
with lawyers, the possibility of cancellations, and so forth, eventually creeps
into the selling price as well.”).
127. See id. at 31 (statement of Wilson J. Vance, Secretary, New Jersey
State Chamber of Commerce) (“[T]here are very few cases that have [actually
come] to trial in the arbitration tribunals, [because] business men have
adopted the practice of getting together and settling their business differences.”).
128. Id. (statement of Thomas B. Paton, General Counsel, American Bankers Association).
129. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD 97-157, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 2 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97157.pdf.
130. Id. at 18.
131. See RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 169 (1997) (“Compulsory employment arbitration offers tremendous benefits to both employers
and employees. It can reduce significantly the costs and time involved in resolving disputes. It also provides a forum for adjudicating grievances to employees currently shut out of the litigation system.”).
132. See Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation
of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 51
(Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004) (finding faster case processing in arbitration); Lewis L.
Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model Employment Termination
Act, 536 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 103, 117 (1994) (finding that legal fees in employment arbitrations were low).
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the arbitrations.133 Other studies found similar win rates for
individuals in arbitration.134 In sum, these research findings
provide supporters and critics of mandatory arbitration reason
to question their original assumptions about this dispute resolution process.
The explosion of arbitration as a means for resolving employment disputes may stem from its popularity with employers seeking a favorable mechanism for conflict resolution or
from its advantages as a cost-saving device.135 Regardless of the
rationale for the increase in employment arbitration, however,
the fact that employment arbitration is so commonly used has
implications for my theory of moral hazard.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
A. OVERVIEW
In this section, I first explain the research methodology for
collecting data from court opinions that reviewed arbitration
awards. Second, I support the moral hazard thesis by showing
that courts that vacate many awards also function like a government insurance agency that relieves a private party of costly liability.

133. See Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their
Rights?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 57–58 (Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004) (finding that employees prevail 33.6% of the time in court versus 46.2% of the time in arbitration; that median damages awarded are $95,554 in court versus $100,000 in
arbitration; and that the average award of attorneys’ fees is $149,756 in court
versus $36,282 in arbitration).
134. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 559, 564–65 (2001) (“[S]ome evidence suggests that claimants
win more cases in arbitration then they do in court . . . .”); Elizabeth Hill, Due
Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under
the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 777, 808, 810 (2003) (arbitrations under AAA’s rules did not reveal bias against employees); William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment
Discrimination, 50 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 42–43 (Oct.–Dec.1995) (comparing win
rates and award amounts for litigation and arbitration in the securities industry from 1992 to 1994, employees won 28% of nonjury trials, 38% of jury trials,
and 48% of arbitrations); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46 (1998) (finding
that employees win 63% of their claims in arbitration and only 14.9% of their
claims in litigation).
135. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note
123, at 6.
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The FAA is supplemented by parallel legislation in nearly
every state. These laws, which were based on the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1955 (UAA),136 set forth their own reviewing
standards for state courts.137 State laws usually mirror FAA
standards while adding one or more grounds for judicial review
of an award.138 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA),
published in 2000 and later adopted by twelve states,139 adds
another layer of court review.140
Federal courts provide additional reviewing standards
when they use common law principles to rule on award challenges. Some principles—for example, that the award shall not
be made in manifest disregard of the law—are unique common
law adjuncts to FAA standards.141
Federal courts also apply an entirely different set of common law reviewing principles. These are standards that the
Supreme Court promulgated specifically for voluntary labor arbitration awards. Such arbitrator rulings are unique insofar as
they resolve union grievances that allege an employer violation
of a labor agreement.
Because labor arbitration is often a quid pro quo for a union’s waiver of a right to strike, Congress provided special
treatment of these rulings.142 This was accomplished by enacting § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), a
law that provides federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) and their embedded arbitration
clauses.143 The privately adopted custom to arbitrate contract
disputes, backed by the LMRA, allowed labor arbitration to be136. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 95 (1956).
137. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 572.19 (2006).
138. See infra note 167.
139. See infra note 169.
140. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000).
141. See infra Part III.C.2.
142. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957) (“Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the
quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike.”). Empirical evidence from the
1950s, when union organizing was at a high level, confirms this observation.
See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, LABORMANAGEMENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS 10 (1953) (reporting that eighty-nine
percent of 1442 firms covered by a labor agreement had an arbitration provision in their contract); see also ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 518 (9th ed. 1980) (estimating that arbitration provisions reflecting this bargained exchange appear in about ninety-six percent of all labor
agreements).
143. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 301(a),
61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)).
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come “the means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may arise . . . .”144
The point is that court review of these challenged awards
occurs under § 301 of the LMRA, rather than the FAA. Section
301 does not specify court reviewing standards, but merely
creates federal jurisdiction to enforce a collective bargaining
agreement.145 To address this vague jurisdiction, the Supreme
Court articulated standards in the Steelworkers Trilogy, three
companion decisions that specifically applied to dispute resolution in union-management relations.146 Despite the unique character of Steelworkers Trilogy standards, there are numerous
court decisions under the FAA in which these labormanagement principles are applied side-by-side with FAA
grounds.
While courts are sincere in proclaiming great deference to
arbitration in hundreds of cases,147 many fail to recognize that
the FAA’s list of four narrow standards has quietly ballooned
over the years. Judges are slow to acknowledge that common
law doctrines further expand their powers. Most recently, they
have overlooked a new trend in state arbitration law that continues to expand grounds for courts to review awards.
Thus, a snowball effect has been created, and the growing
list of reviewing standards is transforming court review into an
insurance program that protects arbitration losers—
particularly employers—from costly awards.
This is ironic. When legislatures and courts apply non-FAA
standards, they may intend to protect the weaker party in arbitration from procedural abuses that were created by the drafter
144. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
145. § 301(a), 61 Stat. at § 156.
146. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–85; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566–68 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596–98 (1960).
147. See, e.g., Durkin v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Corp., 986 F. Supp. 1356,
1358 (D. Kan. 1997) (noting that arbitrator’s decisions deserve a maximum
level of deference). The court in Durkin stated that: the standard of review of
arbitration awards “is among the narrowest known to law.” It went onto note
that: INDFNOnce an arbitration award is entered, the finality that courts
should afford the arbitration process weighs heavily in favor of the award, and
courts must exercise great caution when asked to set aside an award. Because
a primary purpose behind arbitration agreements is to avoid the expense and
delay of court proceedings, it is well settled that judicial review of an arbitration award is very narrowly limited. Id. (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v.
Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1462–63 (10th Cir. 1995)).
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of arbitration agreements.148 How do employers take advantage
of a system that is evolving to curb their unilateral control of
arbitration? The moral hazard theory suggests that employers
perceive many opportunities to overturn an unacceptable
award.149 This is because courts and legislatures are regulating
every aspect of this private dispute resolution process. Thus,
more courts are vacating awards. As this occurs, government
plays the unwitting role of insurer against adverse awards.
“Government” in this context has a complex meaning. It is
not a single government, but four separate and uncoordinated
government bodies that regulate arbitration: the 1925 Congress
who passed the FAA and its four standards, the federal courts
that have developed their own common law for reviewing
awards, state legislatures that passed the UAA and RUAA, and
state courts that have added their own interpretive doctrines
for various facets of award review. Furthermore, these regulatory bodies have never had clear and exclusive boundaries, nor
has there been any effort to coordinate this layered approach.
For employers, the disjointed patchwork of regulation presents
a wide array of reviewing standards that represent a fertile
field of possibilities to attack, and perhaps escape, an award.
B. STATUTORY REGULATION: FAA AND STATE LAWS PATTERNED
ON THE UAA
The main concern of lawmakers who passed the FAA was
to end judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.150 Congress
did not want courts to let parties out of an arbitration agreement and into a lawsuit. Thus, Congress was primarily concerned about court intervention in private disputes before or
during the arbitration.
Lawmakers gave only passing thought to arbitration disputes that arise after the ADR process runs its full course and
results in an award. The FAA’s brief legislative history said:
148. See generally UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 2–7
(2000) (noting that the drafters considered fundamental fairness and bargaining powers in deciding whether or not to allow waiving of sections of the UAA).
149. See supra note 21 (listing sources for an introduction to the moral hazard theory).
150. In the 1924 Senate debate about the FAA, Senator Thomas J. Walsh
explained: “In short, the bill provides for the abolition of the rule that agreements for arbitration will not be specifically enforced.” 66 CONG. REC. 984
(1924) (statement of Sen. Walsh). The same point was raised during the House
debate of the FAA. See 68 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
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“The award may then be entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the other party for fraud and corruption and similar
undue influence, or for palpable error in form.”151 In 1924, the
Senate created a more complete report, reasoning that an
award could be set aside if it was secured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means; if there was partiality or corruption on the
part of the arbitrators; in a situation where an arbitrator is
guilty of misconduct or refused to hear evidence; because of prejudicial misbehavior by the parties; or because the arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers.152 A lawyer’s brief on common law
vacatur provided the main outline for judicial reviewing standards in the FAA153 and now appears in § 10 of the act.154
Contemporary courts believe that these grounds are strikingly narrow.155 The first subsection requires proof of arbitrator fraud or corruption.156 The second is similarly narrow when
it requires proof of evident partiality by the arbitrator.157 The
third basis refers to unlikely events during the arbitration proceedings.158 A hearing must be scheduled, and a party must request a postponement of the hearing.159 In addition, the arbi-

151. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
152. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 4 (1924).
153. At the joint hearing, Julius Henry Cohen, American Bar Association
member of the commerce, trade, and commercial law committee and general
counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, provided a brief that
was accepted into the record and which stated:
The courts are bound to accept and enforce the award of the arbitrators unless there is in it a defect so inherently vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced. This exists only
when corruption, partiality, fraud or misconduct are present or when
the arbitrators exceeded or imperfectly executed their powers or were
influenced by other undue means—cases in which enforcement would
obviously be unjust. There is no authority and no opportunity for the
court, in connection with the award, to inject its own ideas of what
the award should have been.
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearings, supra note 123, at
33–36 (statement and brief of J.H. Cohen, General Counsel, New York State
Chamber of Commerce). The legislative reports and debates said nothing as to
whether postaward and state court litigation rules should be preempted by the
new federal law.
154. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
155. E.g., Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th
Cir. 1997) (“Judicial review of arbitration awards is tightly limited; perhaps it
ought not to be called ‘review’ at all.”).
156. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
157. Id. § 10(a)(2).
158. Id. § 10(a)(3).
159. Id.
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trator must refuse to grant the request for postponement.160
Assuming that these conditions occur, the party moving to vacate an award must prove that the arbitrator was “guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown.”161 Similar to the first two FAA provisions, vacatur depends on arbitrator misconduct.162 The other basis in the
third vacatur element requires proof that the arbitrator refused
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy, or
that the arbitrator was guilty of other misbehavior that prejudiced the rights of a party.163 The fourth and final ground appears to be the broadest since it refers to arbitrator judgment
and discretion.164 A court may vacate an award where arbitrators exceeded their powers.165 Alternatively, an award may be
vacated for being so indefinite that it is imperfectly executed.166
In addition, thirty-five states have adopted the UAA, proposed in 1955 to repeal state laws that obstructed arbitration
agreements, while fourteen other states have enacted similar
legislation.167 Many state laws contain the four statutory standards in § 10 of the FAA and add a fifth basis to vacate an
award.168
160. Id.
161. See id. § 10(a)(3).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. Id. § 10(a)(4).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT prefatory note, 7 U.L.A. 2–7 (2000).
168. The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) also adds a fifth basis for vacating
an award, which the states inherently adopt when codifying the UAA. Section
12, “Vacating an Award,” states that “[u]pon application of a party, the court
shall vacate an award where” the award was a result of corruption, arbitrator
partiality, where an arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, or where an arbitrator should have postponed a hearing. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12
(amended 2000), 7 U.L.A. 497 (1956). The UAA vacatur standards have been
adopted by many states. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120 (2006) (Vacating
an Award); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1512 (2003) (Opposition to an Award);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212 (2006) (Vacating an Award); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 7-912 (2004) (Vacating an Award); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12 (2007) (Vacating an Award); IND. CODE § 34-57-1-17, 2-13 (2008) (Causes which may be
Shown, Vacating an Award); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-412 (2001) (Vacating an
Award); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.160 (West 2005) (Vacating an Award); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938 (2003) (Vacating an Award); MINN. STAT.
§ 572-19 (2006) (Vacating an Award); MO. REV. STAT. § 435.405 (2000) (Vacating an Award); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-312 (2007) (Vacating an Award);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2613 (1995) (Vacating an Award); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1548-130 (1977) (Vacating an Award); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-25A-24 (2004)
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This fairly uniform approach began to fragment after 2000,
when a national panel of experts approved the RUAA. In a
2005 survey of all state laws, the American Arbitration Association reported that twelve states adopted the RUAA.169 The revised vacatur standards appear in Section 23.170
The RUAA drafters identified fourteen issues that required
updating in contemporary arbitration.171 By regulating arbitrations in more detail, these provisions supply award losers with
more grounds to challenge any alteration in procedure. Thus,
these new rules function like an insurance policy for award
challengers.
The RUAA and UAA drafters said that courts should ensure fairness in arbitration. Thus, the RUAA treats arbitration
as a consensual process.172 The model law also broke new
ground by regulating arbitrator neutrality.173 It expanded arbitrator powers to order discovery, rule on summary judgment
motions, conduct prehearing conferences, and manage arbitration processes.174 A new rule empowered courts to enforce a
preaward ruling.175
The RUAA drafters also regulated the remedial boundary
that overlaps arbitration and courts.176 A new section prescribed arbitrator powers to order attorney’s fees, punitive
damages, and other exemplary relief.177 The RUAA also al(Grounds for Vacation of Award); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-213 (2000) (Vacation of Award); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (2007) (Vacating an Award).
Alaska retains the UAA structure, but it also adopted the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act (RUAA). See Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.43.300-.595 (2006).
169. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, supra note 62. The states that adopted the
RUAA are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Id.
170. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23, 7 U.L.A. 73–83 (2000). The revised vacatur standards, appearing in RUAA section 23, added a sixth element and
made other changes in its incorporation of the four FAA standards and the
fifth standard in the UAA. Id.
171. Id. prefatory note, at 1.
172. Id. prefatory note, at 1–2 (“[A]rbitration is a consensual process in
which autonomy of the parties who enter into arbitration agreements should
be given primary consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions
of fundamental fairness.”).
173. Id. § 12 (Disclosure by Arbitrator).
174. Id. §§ 15, 17 (Arbitration Process, Witnesses; Subpoenas; Depositions;
Discovery).
175. Id. § 18 (Judicial Enforcement of Preaward Ruling by Arbitrator).
176. Id. § 21 (Remedies; Fees and Expenses of Arbitration Proceeding).
177. Id. § 21(a)–(b).
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lowed courts to award attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing
party.178
In addition, the revised act reaffirmed the need for arbitral
finality.179 Its regulations were meant to facilitate “the relative
speed, lower cost, and greater efficiency of the [arbitration]
process.”180 In particular, RUAA drafters believed that “in most
cases parties intend the decisions of arbitrators to be final with
minimal court involvement unless there is clear unfairness or a
denial of justice.”181
The moral hazard thesis raises a question with respect to
the RUAA: did its drafters appreciate the tendency by sore losers in arbitration to challenge the results of their private adjudication? The FAA deters challenges by providing very limited
judicial review standards. But the RUAA expanded procedural
regulation of arbitration and also broadened the reviewing role
of courts. The RUAA, therefore, acts as an implicit insurance
program for arbitration losers.
C. COMMON LAW STANDARDS FOR REVIEWING ARBITRATION
AWARDS
1. The Steelworkers Trilogy
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enable businesses to settle
their disputes in arbitration rather than in court.182 In 1947,
Congress enacted another federal law for arbitration clauses in
collective bargaining agreements, though the statute did not
provide standards for reviewing arbitration awards.183 The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) was intended to reduce
strikes and friction between unions and employers by creating
federal jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements.184 Notably, the purposes of the FAA and LMRA are so
178. Id. § 25 (Judgment on Award; Attorney’s Fees and Litigation Expenses).
179. Id. § 25 cmt. n.3 (“Section 25(c) promotes the statutory policy of finality of arbitration awards by adding a provision for recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable expenses of litigation to prevailing parties in contested judicial actions to confirm, vacate, modify or correct an award.”).
180. Id. prefatory note, at 1.
181. Id.
182. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26
(1991) (explaining the congressional intent in passing the FAA).
183. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 156
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)).
184. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,
455 (1957).
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distinct that earlier courts questioned whether labor arbitration awards were reviewable under an arbitration law that was
intended for business disputes.185 The Supreme Court ended
this debate by fashioning federal common law principles to review labor arbitration awards.186 In the Steelworkers Trilogy,187
the Court outlined award reviewing standards.
In terms more vague than the § 10 standards in the FAA,
the Court said that “an arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does
not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice.”188 An
arbitrator “may of course look for guidance from many sources,
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement.”189 By using expressions such as “essence from the collective bargaining agreement”190 and “own brand of industrial justice,”191 Enterprise
Wheel left some room for courts to review the merits of an
award.
Enterprise Wheel underscored its main theme of deference
to the arbitrator when it said that mere ambiguity in the arbitrator’s opinion accompanying an award is not grounds for refusing to enforce that award.192 Furthermore, an award should
not be disturbed unless the arbitrator “has abused the trust the
parties confided in him and has not stayed within the areas
marked out for his consideration.”193 A court should not vacate
an award merely because it disagrees with the arbitrator’s construction of the agreement.194
185. See Donald H. Wollett & Harry H. Wellington, Federalism and Breach
of the Labor Agreement, 7 STAN. L. REV. 445, 458 (1955) (“[The] applicability of
the [FAA] to collective agreements turns upon the construction of the phrase
‘contracts of employment.’ There is disagreement as to whether a collective
agreement is a contract of employment. But the weight of authority holds that
it is, and therefore that the [FAA] is inapplicable to collective bargaining
agreements.”).
186. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 582–85 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 566–68 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593, 596–98 (1960).
187. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582–85; Am. Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. at 566–68; Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 596–98.
188. Enter. Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 598.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 599 (“[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargain-
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Other Steelworkers Trilogy decisions emphasized the
unique institutional features of labor arbitration.195 These
points are important insofar as they suggest that FAA and
RUAA courts should not use Steelworkers Trilogy standards to
review individual employment awards. American Manufacturing noted that the “function of the court is very limited when
the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator” because it is “the arbitrator’s
judgment . . . that was bargained for.”196 This suggests that the
Steelworkers Trilogy Court was referring to voluntary arbitration, where a union and employer agreed to substitute arbitration in place of strikes, lockouts, and other forms of self-help.
At the time of the Steelworkers Trilogy, these reviewing principles were not intended to apply to mandatory arbitration or in
any other nonlabor context.197
The Steelworkers Trilogy has been updated in one essential
area when an award appears to contradict a public policy.198 Intending to limit review of these awards, United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco held that awards may be set aside
only if they “would violate some explicit public policy that is
well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.”199
ing agreement is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator’s construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator’s decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his.”).
195. See, e.g., Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581–85 (1960).
196. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567–68
(1960) (emphasis added).
197. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581 (“[The arbitrator] is
not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior authority which the
parties are obliged to accept. . . . He is rather part of a system of selfgovernment created by and confined to the parties.” (quoting Harry Shulman,
Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1016
(1955))). The Court added that “the labor arbitrator is usually chosen because
of the parties’ confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations which are
not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment.” Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582.
198. See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43–45
(1987).
199. Id. at 43 (citations omitted). More recently, the Court reaffirmed the
principle that judges must demonstrate restraint in reviewing awards. See E.
Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57, 61–62
(2000) (reminding federal judges that “both employer and union have granted
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As discussed below, surprisingly, FAA and RUAA courts
use award-review principles from the Steelworkers Trilogy. Regardless of whether such borrowing is legally appropriate, I
note for purposes of my moral hazard analysis: (1) the Steelworkers Trilogy award-review standards—while narrow—are
broader than the extremely specific vacatur provisions in the
FAA’s § 10; and (2) when courts add Steelworkers Trilogy
grounds in their review of an arbitrator’s ruling, award losers
gain an extra layer of insurance on top of § 10.
2. Manifest Disregard of the Law
Although United Paperworks International Union v. Misco200 was anchored in a labor arbitration context, some courts
apply its test when they review individual employment arbitration awards.201 In addition, some award-reviewing courts apply
a similar though more narrow concept: manifest disregard of
the law.202 This common law standard can lead to vacatur.203
Federal circuit courts are divided in their use of manifest
disregard.204 Adopting the standard, the Second Circuit exto the arbitrator the authority to interpret the meaning of their contract’s language, including such words as ‘just cause’” and that the parties “have ‘bargained for’ the ‘arbitrator’s construction’ of their agreement” and therefore
“courts will set aside the arbitrator’s interpretation of what their agreement
means only in rare instances” (internal citations omitted)); see also Major
League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001)
(“[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of
the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”). In Garvey, the Supreme Court, frustrated by the Ninth Circuit’s meddling, called the court’s behavior “nothing
short of baffling” and admonished the federal judiciary not to overturn “the
arbitrator’s decision because it disagree[s] with the arbitrator’s factual findings, particularly those with respect to credibility.” Id. at 510.
200. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29.
201. E.g., DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 824–25 (2d
Cir. 1997).
202. E.g., LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir.
2001); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
203. E.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 464
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The court vacated the panel’s denial of attorney’s fees because
the arbitrators “appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.” Id. at 464 (quoting DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 821).
204. The standard has been adopted by various circuit courts. See Patten v.
Signator Ins. Agency, Inc., 441 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2006); Prestige Ford v.
Ford Dealer Computer Servs., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Buchignani v. Vining-Sparks IBG, No. 98-6692, 2000 WL 263344, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar.
2, 2000); Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 940–41 (11th Cir. 1992) (per
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plained in Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc. that arbitrators cannot “ignore[] the law or the evidence or both.”205 However, the
standard does not presume that arbitrators know specific
laws.206 Taking a different view, the Seventh Circuit cast doubt
on this standard in Judge Posner’s scholarly opinion.207
Many state courts also apply the manifest disregard standard. Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co. explained: “[i]n certain
circumstances, the governing law may have such widespread
familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a
court could assume the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug.”208
In sum, judicial review of an employment award under the
FAA is not limited to federal courts. State courts play a nearly
co-equal role. Reading only the FAA, one might believe that
courts review employment arbitration awards under the four
standards that Congress enumerated in § 10. To the contrary,
arbitration losers may present up to thirteen separate arguments for vacating awards.209 Common law standards play a
curiam); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060 (9th
Cir. 1991); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978). A Tenth Circuit district court used the standard in Durkin v. CIGNA Property & Casualty
Corporation, 986 F. Supp. 1356, 1358 (D. Kan. 1997).
205. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).
206. In DiRussa, an age-discrimination complainant was awarded
$220,000, but his request for attorney’s fees—totaling $249,050.10—was denied. DiRussa, 121 F.3d at 820. In his motion to vacate that part of the award,
DiRussa argued that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the ADEA’s policy
for granting attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs. Id. at 822. The Second Circuit disagreed, stating that “the remedy for that does not lie with us.” Id. at
823. The court further noted that “‘knowing’ all of the provisions of a particular statutory scheme without assistance from the parties is a daunting task,
even for a skilled lawyer or judge.” Id.
207. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th
Cir. 1994). Judge Posner expressed strong doubts about the manifestdisregard standard by noting that “[w]e can understand neither the need for
the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration (we suspect none—that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modern law of arbitration.” Id.
208. Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994) (citing Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990)).
209. Such arguments include: (1) manifest disregard of the law (nonSteelworkers Trilogy common law standard); (2) exceed powers or imperfectly
execute award (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2006) or state UAA equivalent); (3) partiality (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) or state UAA equivalent); (4) award violated a public
policy (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (5) misconduct (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3)
or state UAA equivalent); (6) lacks jurisdiction due to timeliness requirements
(9 U.S.C. § 12 or state equivalent); (7) arbitrator committed a fact-finding er-
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major role in this process. Some are from the Steelworkers Trilogy; others, such as manifest disregard for the law, are unique
to FAA review. But this odd balkanization is hard to defend.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended federal and
state courts to vary so much in the standards that they apply to
contested awards.
IV. CASE ANALYSIS AND QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENTS:
EXPLAINING THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATISTICAL FINDINGS
Part IV features an examination of cases in which courts
defied the norm of confirming awards. When combined with the
data in Part V, my discussion of the qualitative problems in
confirming awards informs the analysis of moral hazard in arbitration.
A. COURTS ALTER THE ARBITRATOR’S REMEDY
In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, the Michigan Court of
Appeals vacated an arbitrator’s award of $915,214 in front pay
to an employee who was discharged after a supplier brought a
charge against him.210 The arbitrator found that DaimlerChrysler breached its express agreement to “conduct a ‘fair and thorough investigation’ of a supplier’s allegations” against the employee before discharging him.211 The arbitrator ordered the
company to reinstate Mr. Carson pending a thorough and fair
investigation and to give him back pay from the time of discharge until reinstatement.212
However, after the company failed to reinstate Mr. Carson
or to conduct another investigation, the arbitrator awarded the
employee $450,000 in back pay and $915,214 in front pay, less
$144,000 in mitigation earnings.213 The award was based on
ror (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (8) arbitrary and capricious, irrational,
or gross error (non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard); (9) arbitrator
exceeded authority (Steelworkers Trilogy common law); (10) award procured by
corruption, fraud, or undue means (9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) or state UAA equivalent); (11) award did not draw its essence from the agreement (Steelworkers
Trilogy common law); (12) remedy was punitive, excessive, or unauthorized
(non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard); and (13) unconstitutional or
due process challenge (non-Steelworkers Trilogy common law standard).
210. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, No. 237315, 2003 WL 888043,
at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003).
211. See Id. at *1.
212. Id. at *4.
213. Id.
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evidence that Mr. Carson sent out nearly five hundred resumes, attended four job fairs, and had eighty-one interviews
without finding another permanent job.214 The arbitrator determined that the employee’s work-life expectancy was age sixty-seven and set this as the endpoint for front pay.215
This case is highlighted because the state court appeared
to usurp the arbitrator’s adjudicatory function. Specifically, the
court reviewed DaimlerChrysler’s argument that Carson was
not entitled to relief beyond nominal damages because he was
an at-will employee.216 The court ruled that Carson’s employment contract fell “between the extremes of at-will and justcause.”217 This was a legal ruling on the merits of the parties’
contentions at arbitration, as though the judges were the appointed arbitrators.
The court also relitigated another part of the employment
dispute when the judges modified the remedy. In vacating the
front-pay award, the court reasoned that the arbitrator had no
authority to order “damages in lieu of reinstatement.”218 The
court ignored the fact that the company never complied with
the original award that ordered reinstatement and a fair investigation. In sum, Carson shows how a court intervenes piecemeal to usurp an arbitrator’s authority.219
B. EXCESSIVE DELAY AND LITIGATION EXPENSE CAUSED BY
LOWER COURT VACATUR OF AN AWARD
While vacatur of awards may be justified on rare occasion,
it can leave the disputants without a ruling. As discussed below, Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc highlights a trend in
which vacatur prolongs a process that is usually fast and lowcost.220 In Sawtelle, a fired securities broker alleged that his
employer maliciously tried to sever his relationship with clients
by defaming him.221 The arbitration was lengthy and expen214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at *4.
217. See id. at *1.
218. Id. at *5.
219. The Carson opinion conflicts with the idea that a “court cannot interfere with an arbitration proceeding—without abusing its discretion—if a valid
arbitration agreement exists and the specific dispute falls within the substance and scope of that agreement.” Smith, Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v.
Robinson, 12 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1994).
220. 754 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
221. Id. at 267–68.

LEROY_mlr

2009]

3/15/2009 5:49 PM

EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN ARBITRATIONS

1035

sive.222 Arbitrators awarded Mr. Sawtelle nearly $1.83 million
in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages.223
The first state court to rule on Sawatelle’s employer’s challenge largely confirmed the award.224 But the New York Court
of Appeals vacated the punitive award and remanded the case
to the same arbitrators.225 The judges reasoned that “in awarding $25 million in punitive damages, the [arbitration] panel
completely ignored applicable law, an error that provides a
separate basis for vacating the award.”226 They also believed
that Sawtelle’s award for punitive damages could not be justified under the guideposts of BMW of North America v. Gore.227
Thus, the award manifestly disregarded the law.228
On remand, the arbitrators “accepted voluminous written
submissions, held a one-day hearing, and issued a second
award.”229 Their new award contained only one cosmetic
change230 and the same punitive damages.231 When the lower
court reviewed the matter again, it vacated the punitive part a
second time because of its disproportionate ratio to actual damages.232
Concerned that another remand to the same panel would
not change anything, the lower court ordered a third arbitration before a new panel.233 This prompted Sawtelle to ask the
court to order remittitur for the excessive portion of the punitive award and spare him the additional time and expense in
re-arbitrating his case.234 The court conceded that Mr. Saw-

222. Id. at 268.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 269 (noting that the New York State Supreme Court reduced
compensatory damages to $1.08 million but left punitive damages untouched).
225. Id. at 276.
226. Id. at 273.
227. Id. at 270–72 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996)).
228. Id. at 274.
229. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004).
230. Id. (noting that the only change that the panel made was to modify its
finding that the employer “orchestrated a campaign of deception” to the phrase
that the company “orchestrated and conducted a horrible campaign of deception, defamation and persecution of Claimant”).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 859.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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telle’s “suggestion seems to make sense,”235 and that the “history of this arbitration undermines the very purpose of arbitration . . . to provide a manner of dispute resolution more swift
and economical than litigation in court.”236 Still, the lower court
denied the motion because no statute authorized a conditional
reduction in an award. The court affirmed its earlier order for a
third round of arbitration before new arbitrators.237 Another
arbitration odyssey appears in Selby General Hospital v. Kindig,238 a case that began with a contract dispute in February,
1998 and ended in a July, 2006 decision by an Ohio Court of
Appeals.239
C. EXPANDED REVIEW OF AN AWARD
Expanded review clauses may also lead to award nullification. For instance, in Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, an AfricanAmerican woman quit her job after her supervisor required her
to repeat a performance test and threatened to fire her.240 During a stressful disciplinary meeting, Gracie Cook cried, stuttered, and rubbed her arm.241 Her doctor believed that she suffered stress-induced mini-strokes.242 After she sued her
employer, Raytheon, in state court on claims that included
emotional distress and discrimination, the dispute was submitted to an arbitrator.243
The arbitrator ruled for the Cooks, granting the former
employee $200,000 in damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and her husband $25,000 in damages for loss of
consortium.244 Raytheon sued to vacate the award on the
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 860.
238. No. 04CA53, 2006 WL 2457436 (Ohio Ct. App. July 17, 2006).
239. Id. at *1.
240. 254 F.3d 588, 591–92 (5th Cir. 2001).
241. Id. at 591.
242. Id.
243. Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 148 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (N.D. Tex.
2000), aff ’d, 254 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2001). Cook originally filed a complaint in
Texas state court alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress in connection with the end of her employment. Id. Later, her complaint was
amended to include a Title VII discrimination claim and a tort claim on behalf
of her husband for loss of consortium. Id. After the company moved to compel
arbitration of the claims, the parties submitted their dispute to an arbitrator.
Id.
244. Id. The arbitrator determined that the company knew that Cook had
previously suffered a stroke when it assigned her back to her former job duties
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grounds that the parties bargained for expanded review and
the evidence did not support the arbitrator’s tort finding. Ms.
Cook disagreed, contending that the expanded review clause
was “inconsistent with the agreement itself and unconscionable
in light of the parties’ respective bargaining positions.”245
The district court vacated the award, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the vacatur ruling.246 The district court appeared to
re-arbitrate the dispute when it reasoned that Raytheon’s
treatment of Ms. Cook was not extreme and outrageous conduct.247 Ignoring the finality of the award, the court said that
“it was not unfair for the arbitration agreement to include a
standard of review that allowed the district court to assess the
arbitrator’s legal and factual conclusions.”248 The Fifth Circuit
continued by evaluating the merits of the arbitration case when
it reviewed the conduct of Raytheon’s supervisor, finding that it
was not extreme and outrageous.249
Another arbitration award was nullified as a result of an
expanded review clause. A principal of a Christian school sued
her administrator and school board for Title VII sexual harassment and whistleblower violations in Prescott v. Northlake
Christian School.250 A court ordered arbitration after the school
presented an employment contract that reflected the parties’
agreement to use dispute resolution principles and procedures
from the Institute of Christian Conciliation.251 The contract incorporated the Montana Uniform Arbitration Act (MUAA)252
and contained the parties’ handwritten amendment providing
that “[n]o party waives appeal rights, if any, by signing this
agreement.”253
upon her return. Id. Thus, the arbitrator concluded that the company’s treatment of Cook caused her stress, and that placing her in that situation was “extreme and outrageous.” Id. at 745.
245. Hughes Training, Inc., 254 F.3d at 592.
246. Id. at 595.
247. Id. at 592 (reporting that the district court “determined that Raytheon’s decision to immediately continue Cook’s time-sensitive evaluation was not
extreme and outrageous conduct”).
248. Id. at 594.
249. Id. at 595 (“Employers cannot be expected to cater to the peculiar sensitivities of an employee who cannot physically work in a stressful environment.”).
250. 369 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2004).
251. Id. at 493.
252. Id. The Institute of Christian Conciliation rules and procedures “included conducting the arbitration pursuant to” the MUAA. Id.
253. Id. at 494.
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After Ms. Prescott won her arbitration and was awarded
$157,856.52, the school district returned to federal court to vacate the award.254 The district court denied the motion, interpreting the handwritten amendment to mean that the parties
could only appeal under the narrow limits of the Montana arbitration law.255 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and
construed a disputed contract term as ambiguous.256
Ignoring the principle of deferring to awards,257 Judge
Edith Jones reasoned that the “FAA . . . does not bar parties
from structuring an arbitration by means of their contractual
agreements, nor does it preempt all state laws regarding arbitration.”258 Writing that “a contractual modification is acceptable,”259 Judge Jones concluded that the “parties intended judicial review to be available beyond the normal narrow range of
the FAA or MUAA.”260
A recent Supreme Court decision on expanded review of an
arbitrator’s award would likely have affected the outcome of
these cases. In Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.,261 a commercial landlord required a manufacturer who leased the property to indemnify the landowner for any environmental liabilities.262 The parties became embroiled in a dispute over liability
for pollutants in the well water.263 After litigating the lease’s
termination clause in federal district court, the parties agreed,
under the court’s supervision, to arbitrate the indemnification
clause.264 Notably, the arbitration agreement contained a provision for expanded judicial review of the award.265
The Supreme Court recognized that arbitration is meant to
be flexible—so flexible that parties may “tailor some, even
many features of arbitration by contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what their qualifications should be, which
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 497–98.
257. Id. at 494–95.
258. Id. at 496.
259. Id. (quoting Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d
993, 996 (5th Cir. 1995), abrogated by Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 1396 (2008)).
260. Id. at 498.
261. 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008).
262. Id. at 1400.
263. Id. at 1400–01.
264. Id. at 1401.
265. Id.
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issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and choice of substantive law.”266 But the Court ruled that parties cannot agree
to expand judicial review of awards beyond the statutory standards in the FAA.267
This ruling likely means that the employment arbitration
cases featured in Part V.C and decided in favor of employers
who drafted expanded review provisions would be treated differently today. Courts would not enforce these expanded review
provisions,268 and consequently, a source for the moral hazard
problem would be eliminated. However, because less than two
percent of the arbitration contracts in this study’s database had
expanded review clauses, much of the moral hazard dilemma is
unaffected by Hall Street. The larger problem is that courts
have added common law standards,269 and some states have
expanded review by adopting the RUAA.270
D. STATE REGULATION OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURES
The FAA does not regulate arbitrator disclosure of conflicts
of interest,271 but some states do.272 Ovitz v. Schulman,273 an
important decision by a California appeals court, shows how a
disclosure law leads to vacatur.274 Ms. Schulman never proved
266. Id. at 1400–01.
267. Id. at 1404 (noting that the text of the FAA “compels a reading of the
§§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive”). Explaining its ruling, the Court observed that reviewing standards in Section 10 of the FAA deal with extreme
arbitration misconduct. Thus, the opinion concluded, ‘“Fraud’ and a mistake of
law are not cut from the same cloth.” Id. at 1405.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 182–209 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 169–81 and accompanying text.
271. David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interests and Disclosures: Are We
Making a Mountain out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008).
272. See Ruth V. Glick, California Arbitration Reform: The Aftermath, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 119, 133–36 (2003) (noting that in addition to California, “[a]t
least two other states, New York and Texas, have begun to draft legislation
regulating arbitrator disclosure”).
273. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
274. Id. at 118 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2, subd. (a)(6)(A)) (noting that the vacatur dispute involved the California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitrations, created in response to a legislative mandate). The arbitration involved a wrongful termination claim by
Cathy Schulman, former president of a major film company. Id. at 119. During
the proceedings, the arbitrator accepted another appointment in a separate
arbitration involving the same movie company. Id. at 120–21. After the arbitrator denied Schulman’s claims and awarded her former employer approximately $1.5 million in damages and $1.9 million in attorney fees and costs,
Schulman invoked the disclosure law as grounds for vacating the award. Id. at
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or tried to show arbitrator bias or evident partiality,275 as the
FAA would require.276 She simply made her vacatur case on the
arbitrator’s unwitting noncompliance with the state’s disclosure statute, an easier proof.277 Ovitz shows how a court vacates an award for a technicality that is unrelated to proof of
actual injury.278
Some state laws also regulate the awarding of attorney’s
fees in arbitration.279 This is relevant because private arbitration services have rules that authorize this remedy.280 The FAA
does not preclude this relief.281 Thus, federal courts acting under the FAA confirm awards that order attorney’s fees.282 But,
Section 21(b) of the RUAA regulates this remedy. It opens the
door to award challenges, stating that “arbitrator[s] may award
reasonable attorney’s fees and other reasonable expenses of arbitration if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action
involving the same claim or by the agreement of the parties to
the arbitration proceeding.”283 Some state courts vacate awards
121–22. The appellate court found merit in her argument and affirmed the trial court’s denial to reconsider its vacatur. Id. at 129–30.
275. Id. at 135.
276. Id. at 131.
277. Id. at 122. By contrast, the FAA is silent on the subject of arbitrator
disclosures. Larson, supra note 271. If Schulman had sued under this law, her
prospects of vacating the award would have been highly doubtful. She would
have been required to prove that the inadvertent nondisclosure amounted to
bias or partiality. Ovitz, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118 (citing Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006)).
278. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 128.
279. Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Happily Never After: When Final
and Binding Arbitration Has No Fairy Tale Ending, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
167, 192 (2008).
280. See JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 2 (2005), http://www.jamsadr.com/
images/PDF/Employment_Arbitration_Min_Std.PDF (“All remedies that
would be available under the applicable law in a court proceeding, including
attorneys fees and exemplary damages, must remain available in the arbitration. Post-arbitration remedies, if any, must remain available to an employee.”).
281. Michael H. LeRoy, Misguided Fairness? Regulating Arbitration by
Statute: Empirical Evidence of Declining Award Finality, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 551, 592–93 (2008).
282. E.g., Pirooz v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:05MC521CDP, 2006
WL 568571, at *2, *8 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 7, 2006), aff ’d, 237 Fed. App’x 125 (8th
Cir. 2007) (ordering employer to comply with arbitrator’s award granting
payment of $106,832.69 in attorney’s fees to the prevailing employee, and increasing the amount due to $120,253.35 to reflect arbitration costs and prejudgment interest).
283. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 20, 7 U.L.A. 69 (2000) (emphasis added).
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that order employers to pay the attorney’s fees of the prevailing
employee.284
In addition, states regulate arbitrator awards of punitive
damages. Unlike the FAA, the RUAA’s Section 21 allows this
challenge if the arbitrator’s remedy would not be justified in a
civil action involving the same claim.285 New York courts used
this reasoning to vacate the punitive award in Sawtelle.286 In
contrast, in an FAA decision that left a punitive award undisturbed,287 a federal judge reasoned that even if arbitrators ignored some evidence, their error was “not so obvious or egregious as to require overturning the award.”288
V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODS
AND STATISTICAL RESULTS
A. METHOD FOR CREATING THE SAMPLE
Drawing from methods derived in my earlier empirical
studies,289 I used a sample based on Westlaw’s Internet service.290 I searched federal and state databases for cases because
284. Carson v. PaineWebber, Inc., 62 P.3d 996 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) and
Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho 2005), are two cases that involve
the RUAA statutes that were used to vacate awards of attorney’s fees. In Cassedy v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 751 So. 2d 143, 145 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000), the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s vacatur of
the arbitrator’s order that the employer pay a fired employee $300,000 in compensatory damages and also $160,000 in lawyer fees.
285. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 20, 7 U.L.A. 69 (2000) (“An arbitrator
may award punitive damages or other exemplary relief if such an award is authorized by law in a civil action involving the same claim and the evidence
produced at the hearing justifies the award under the legal standards otherwise applicable to the claim.” (emphasis added)). Emphasis is added because
the law places a condition on this arbitrator power, thus limiting arbitrator
discretion and creating a new ground for review.
286. Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858–60 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004).
287. Acciardo v. Millennium Secs. Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 413, 422–23
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
288. Id. at 423.
289. E.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, As the Enterprise Wheel
Turns: New Evidence on the Finality of Labor Arbitration Awards, 18 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 191, 202–03 (2007); see also Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille,
Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of Workplace
Arbitration Systems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 45–48 (2001) [hereinafter LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice]; Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille,
Reinventing the Enterprise Wheel: Court Review of Punitive Awards in Labor
and Employment Arbitrations, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 199, 230–34 (2006).
290. Datasets, programs, and survey commentary are the results of a survey independently completed by the author and not by the Minnesota Law Re-
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employers and individuals are allowed a choice of forum to contest awards. I also used keywords derived from terms in the
FAA, RUAA, and state arbitration laws.291
I limited cases to arbitrations involving an individual and
employer. Each case involved a post-award dispute in which an
arbitrator’s ruling was challenged by either an employee or
employer. I excluded arbitration cases involving unions and
employers because they involve unique characteristics of labormanagement relations.292
The sample began with a 1975 decision293 and ended with
cases from September, 2007. After I identified a potential case,
I read it to see if it met the inclusion criteria. For example, I
excluded pre-arbitration disputes over enforcement of an arbitration clause. On the other hand, I included cases where employees resisted arbitration, were compelled to arbitrate their
claims, and were later involved in a postaward lawsuit.294 Some
cases involved employees who preferred court to arbitration but
prevailed in the private forum, leading the employer to seek
vacatur.295
Once a case met the criteria, I checked it against a roster of
previously coded cases to avoid duplication.296 Next, I took relevant data from each case. Variables included: (1) party who
won the award; (2) state or federal court; (3) first court ruling
on motion to confirm or vacate an award; and (4) appellate rul-

view. Survey results are on file with the author.
291. E.g., “PROCURED BY CORRUPTION,” or “EVIDENT PARTIALITY,”
or “REFUSING TO POSTPONE THE HEARING,” or “ARBITRATORS EXCEEDED THEIR POWERS,” or “IMPERFECTLY EXECUTED.”
292. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 581 (1960) (“[T]he grievance machinery under a collective bargaining
agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government.”).
293. McClure v. Montgomery County Cmty. Action Agency, No. 4798, 1975
WL 181652 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 7, 1975).
294. E.g., Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 145 (2d Cir.
2004).
295. For example, in Madden v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 883 S.W.2d 79, 80–
81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), an employee sued his employer but was ordered by the
court to arbitrate his claim. After he prevailed in arbitration and was awarded
$250,000, the employer sued to vacate the award, but the court denied the motion. Id.
296. In rare cases, an award was challenged once and remanded to arbitration; after arbitrators ruled again, the award was challenged a second time.
See, e.g., Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 789 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2004). Because the awards differed, I treated these award challenges as
separate cases, even though the parties and dispute remained the same.
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ing, where appropriate. Companion studies297 analyzed other
data.
The data form contained a menu of grounds for a party to
challenge an award. There were four FAA options, five UAA options (and a sixth possibility contained in the RUAA), five
Steelworkers Trilogy standards, and five separate federal common law standards.298 The list also included a miscellaneous
category for punitive awards, awards with excessive remedies,
and awards that violated the Constitution.
B. METHOD FOR COMPARING REVERSAL RATES BY COURTS
As this research progressed, a question emerged: what
should be an inappropriate rate for vacating awards? A benchmark was needed to scale whatever vacatur rate is measured.
Therefore, as the database grew, research began on similar
studies that provide statistical measures of appellate court affirmance or reversal of a lower court or agency ruling.
Comparative data provide a better assessment of whether
judicial deference to awards is insufficient, moderate, or excessive. Based on this body of research depicting appellate reversal rates, the study created the following hierarchy of court deference: (A) Extreme Deference299 (affirmance rate of 92.0% or
297. LeRoy & Feuille, supra note 279, at 186 tbl.1 (finding a spurt of cases
in the federal district courts since 2000 that review employment arbitration
awards); LeRoy, supra note 281, at 600 (using an earlier database to conclude
that states are expanding arbitration reviewing standards, a development that
is undermining the national policy favoring arbitration). The present study
adds two innovations. Here, the study analyzes awards by the winning party.
It computes vacatur rates for awards that were won by employees, and awards
won by employers. This empirical question is then related to a new theoretical
question: whether judicial review of employment arbitration creates moral hazard.
298. Earlier, I explained the arguments that parties have to challenge employment awards. See supra Part IV. But here I enumerate more grounds. The
difference is that some arguments are redundant. For example, “the arbitrator
exceeded his authority” is an FAA and a Steelworkers Trilogy standard. Thus,
it is coded in two separate places on the form.
299. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in
the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 947 (examining appellate court reversal of
lower courts in the federal system). In employment discrimination cases, appellate courts reversed less than 6% of wins by employers at trial. Id. at 957.
This is an extreme example of appellate court deference. A recent study of the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals provides a second example of extreme judicial
deference. See Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its
Processing, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 287 (2006). This study showed that as the circuit’s
caseload mushroomed from 1945 to 2005, appellate courts reversed rulings at
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more, or reversal rate of 8.0% or less); (B) Great Deference300
(affirmance rate of 84.0% to 91.9%, or reversal rate of 8.1% to
16.0%); (C) High Deference301 (affirmance rate of 76.0% to
83.9%, or reversal rate of 16.1% to 24.0%); (D) Moderate Deference302 (affirmance rate of 68.0% to 75.9%, or reversal rate of
24.1% to 32.0%); (E) Slight Deference303 (affirmance rate of
60.0% to 67.9%, or reversal rate of 32.1% to 40.0%); or (F) No
Deference304 (reversal rate 40.1% or more).
C. STATISTICAL FINDINGS AND QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT
The sample had 267 employment arbitration awards that
were challenged in federal or state courts. Following a court’s
ruling, 176 cases were appealed. Overall, 443 court decisions
confirmed or vacated awards, or rendered a split ruling.

a far lower rate. Id. at 289 tbl.1 (finding that the reversal rate was 32.1% in
1945, 22.5% in 1955, 23.6% in 1965, 21.4% in 1975, 18.2% in 1985, and 9.3% in
1995; the reversal rate in 2005 dropped to 7.4%).
300. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 965–66
(1996) (analyzing 1224 National Labor Relations Board decisions that were
appealed to federal courts). Courts reviewed NLRB decisions with great deference in cases where a union violated the National Labor Relations Act, reversing in only 14.7% of cases. Id. at 976 tbl.3.
301. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000). Moore
found that appeals courts affirmed judge and jury factfinding in patent disputes at the same rate: 78%. Id. at 397 tbl.6.
302. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, The Steelworkers Trilogy
and Grievance Arbitration Appeals: How the Federal Courts Respond, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 78 (1991). This research analyzed 1148 federal district court
decisions and 480 federal circuit court decisions that resulted in a court order
that compelled or denied arbitration or that enforced or vacated an arbitrator’s
award in whole or in part. Id. at 98. These decisions were published after June
23, 1960 and before July 24, 1990. Id. at 98 n.105. A follow-up study compared
this research with reported data for court review of awards from 1991–2001.
LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice, supra note 289, at 50 tbl.1. In the first study,
award confirmation rates by district and appellate courts from 1960–1991
were, respectively, 71.8% and 70.5%. Id. The more recent study observed very
similar confirmation rates, with district courts enforcing 70.3% of all challenged awards, and appellate courts confirming 66.4% of awards. Id.
303. For example, LeRoy & Feuille, Private Justice, supra note 289, demonstrated slight judicial deference. Federal appeals courts confirmed 66.4% of
labor awards. Id. at 49.
304. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in
the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of
the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 506 (2002) (finding
that the Nebraska Supreme Court vacated twelve of twenty-nine death penalty sentences for a reversal rate of 41.4%).
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Before proceeding to Table 1, infra, I report on the frequency of employer and employee wins at arbitration. The following percentages are not vacatur or confirmation rates. Rather, they show how often employees or employers won at
arbitration.
At the federal level, district courts ruled on 160 awards
and appeals courts ruled on eighty-three awards. In the district
court cases (Table 1), employers had won ninety awards at arbitration (56.3%). Individuals had won fifty-five awards (34.4%)
and split awards in the remaining fifteen cases (9.3%). In federal appellate decisions (Table 3), employers had won fifty-six
awards at arbitration (67.5%). Employees had won twenty
awards (24.1%) and split awards in seven cases (8.4%).
At the state level, the sample had 107 rulings from firstlevel courts (Table 2)305 and ninety-three rulings from appellate
courts (Table 4). Employers had won arbitration awards in forty-seven of the cases at the first level, or 43.9% of the challenged awards in this category. Individuals had won forty-nine
awards (45.8%) and split awards in the remaining eleven cases
(10.3%). In state appellate decisions, employers had won fortyfive awards at arbitration (48.4%). Employees had won thirtynine awards (41.9%) and had split awards in nine cases (9.7%).
Table 1
Federal District Court Review of Arbitration Awards:
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins
Confirm
Partly Confirm
Vacate
Award
Award
Award

Total

Employer
Wins Award

83
92.2%

1
1.1%

6
6.7%

90

Split Award

14
93.3%
51
92.7%
148
92.5%

0
0%
2
3.6%
3
1.9%

1
6.7%
2
3.6%
9
5.6%

15

Employee
Wins Award
Total
χ2 2.063,
df = .724

55
160

305. States use different names for courts that conduct first review of
awards (e.g., circuit court, superior court). Here, these tribunals are generically called “first-level courts”.
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Table 2
State First-Level Court Review of Arbitration Awards:
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins
Confirm
Partly Confirm
Vacate
Award
Award
Award
Employer
Wins Award
Split Award
Employee
Wins Award
Total
χ2 13.351,
df = 4, .010

41
87.2%
6
54.5%
38
77.6%
85
79.4%

0
0%
2
18.2%
1
2.0%
3
2.8%

Table 4
State Appellate Court Review of Arbitration Awards:
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins
Confirm
Partly Confirm
Vacate
Award
Award
Award

Employee
Wins Award
Total
χ2 10.553,
df = 4, .032

39
86.7%
6
66.7%
22
56.4%
67
72.0%

1
2.2%
1
11.1%
7
17.9%
9
9.7%

Total

6
12.8%
3
27.3%
10
20.4%
19
17.8%

Table 3
Federal Appellate Court Review of Arbitration Awards:
Vacatur of Employee and Employer Wins
Confirm
Partly Confirm
Vacate
Award
Award
Award
Employer
48
0
8
Wins Award
85.7%
0%
14.3%
Split Award
5
0
2
71.4%
0%
28.6%
Employee
17
3
0
Wins Award
85.0%
15.0%
0%
70
3
10
Total
84.3%
3.6%
12.0%
χ2 13.831,
df = 4, .008

Employer
Wins Award
Split Award

[93:998

5
11.1%
2
22.2%
10
25.6%
17
18.3%

47
11
49
107

Total
56
7
20
83

Total
45
9
39
93
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Chart 1
Court Confirmation of Award by Winning Party
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Federal District
Court

State First‐
Level Court

Employer Wins

Federal
State Appeals
Appeals Court

Split Award

Individual Wins

Finding No. 1: All courts consistently confirmed awards
at extremely high levels when employers won the arbitration.
Federal district and appellate courts confirmed, respectively,
employer-winning awards in 92.2% (Table 1) and 85.7% (Table
3) of the cases. The difference in these confirmation rates was
small (6.5 percentage points). State courts behaved similarly,
confirming employer wins in 87.2% (Table 2) and 86.7% (Table
4) of first-level and appellate rulings. Comparing state confirmation rates, there was virtually no difference between firstlevel and appeals courts (0.5 percentage points).
Finding No. 2: Federal courts ruled similarly on employee
and employer wins at arbitration. Federal district courts
treated employee wins at arbitration the same as employer victories. As shown in Table 1, judges confirmed 92.7% of wins for
employees and 92.2% of wins for employers. Table 3 illustrates
that federal appeals courts confirmed 85.7% of employer wins,
which matched the percentage of pro-employee awards (85.0%).
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Finding No. 3: Federal courts were consistent in their extremely high deference to awards, confirming only slightly
more awards at the district level. Comparing awards that favored employers, the overall difference between district and
appellate court confirmation rates was 6.5 percentage points.306
In the same comparison for awards that favored employees, the
difference between district and appellate court confirmation
rates was 7.7 percentage points.307
Finding No. 4: State courts overturned more awards than
federal courts. As shown in Table 2, judges enforced only 77.6%
of employee wins in state courts where awards were first challenged. This moderately high confirmation rate was 14.6% less
than federal district courts (Compare Table 1, Cell for Employer Wins, 92.2%). This difference was statistically significant.308
Finding No. 5: State courts were inconsistent in reviewing
awards, as their appellate courts confirmed fewer arbitrator
rulings than their first-level courts. Comparing awards that
ruled for employers, state courts ruled the same in first-level
(87.2%) and appellate cases (86.7%).309 In the same comparison
for awards that favored employees, the state confirmation rate
fell 21.2 percentage points—from 77.6% at first-level courts in
Table 2 to 56.4% for appellate courts in Table 4.
Finding No. 6: State appellate courts vacated many more
wins for employees than for employers. Comparing award enforcement at the appellate level, Table 4 illustrates that state
courts confirmed 86.7% of proemployer awards but only 56.4%
of employee wins at arbitration. This difference was statistically significant.310

306. Compare supra tbl.1 (showing that federal district courts confirmed
92.2% of employer wins), with supra tbl.3 (demonstrating that federal appellate courts confirmed 85.7% of employer wins).
307. Compare supra tbl.1 (illustrating that federal district courts confirmed
92.7% of employee wins), with supra tbl.3 (showing that federal appellate
courts confirmed 85.0% of employee wins).
308. See supra tbl.2 (chi-squared = 13.351 with 4 degrees of freedom, implying that the difference in rates would not likely occur by chance).
309. Compare supra tbl.2, with supra tbl.4 (showing that state courts rule
the same in first-level and appellate cases).
310. See supra tbl.4 (implying that the difference in rates would not likely
occur by chance with a calculated chi-squared value of 10.553 with 4 degrees
of freedom).
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VI. TWO SOLUTIONS
A. STATE COURTS CREATE MORAL HAZARD BY VACATING A HIGH
PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEE WINS AT ARBITRATION
Although the FAA envisioned that courts would rarely vacate awards, this Article suggests that state courts interfere
with arbitration outcomes more often than Congress envisioned. I postulate that these intrusions encourage employers
to focus on defecting from the promise of offering arbitration as
a forum substitute. The possibility now exists for employers to
take fewer precautions against unlawful conduct that risks liability. My thesis is that vacatur courts function like an insurance agency by relieving at-fault employers of liability. Figure 1
conceptualizes this form of moral hazard.
Figure 1:
How Arbitration Insures
Employers Against Liability

Pre-Dispute
Phase:
Employee prefers recourse in
court, but accedes to employer’s version
of arbitration

Employer
avoids court
when a judge
enforces the
arbitration
agreement.

Employer challenges award.
Court grants
employer motion to vacate
award.

Arbitration
occurs. Employer specifies the forum
and its
process rules.

Arbitrator rules
for the employee, and
orders a remedy that the employer refuses
to accept.

Post-Arbitration
Phase:
Employer avoids
trial, nullifies
award, and incurs
no liability for
wrongdoing. Employee is denied
access to trial, loses
favorable award in
court, and has no
recourse.

Courts in this study also vacated some awards in favor of
employers, though this very small percentage seems to be in
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line with congressional intent that judges defer to arbitrators.311 Still, this result raises the potential for moral hazard
because employers tend to be “repeat players” in arbitration.312
In contrast, individuals are one-shot players who have no strategic incentive to learn from this experience.313 I theorize, as a
corollary to my main thesis, that even when employers lose an
award due to vacatur, the experience may teach them how to
vacate employee wins in the future. Whether employers insert
a clause for expanded court review of the arbitration, or are
simply aware of the many grounds to challenge an adverse
award, they understand arbitration better than employees.
This reality contrasts with a trend that began to favor employees in the 1970s. Consider workers who challenge an employer action—for example, termination—by arbitrating a contract grievance and suing separately under a discrimination
statute. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme
Court concluded that an employee’s statutory right to a trial
under Title VII is not foreclosed by the prior submission of his
discrimination claim to final and binding arbitration under a
collective-bargaining agreement.314 This phenomenon is described as “two bites at the apple” because a claimant is allowed to bring a similar claim on the same facts in two separate
forums.315
The moral hazard depicted in Figure 1 creates the opposite
dilemma: “no bites at the apple” for some claimants. This outcome plainly violates Gilmer’s assumption of forum substitution. How else can one interpret the results for state appellate
courts, which confirmed only 56.4% of proemployee awards?316
Is this not evidence of “judicial hostility” to arbitration—the
very antithesis of congressional intent when the FAA was
311. See supra tbls.1, 2, 3 & 4 (illustrating that, when an employer won in
arbitration, federal district courts vacated only 6.7% of the awards, state district courts vacated 12.8%, federal appellate courts vacated 14.3%, and state
appellate courts vacated 11.1%).
312. See Bingham, supra note 55.
313. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of
the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 313, 330 (2007) (“It has long been known in the legal literature that, when one side to a controversy is a repeat player and the other side
is a ‘one-shot player,’ the law evolves to inefficient rules that favor the repeat
player.”).
314. 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
315. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 310 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
316. See supra tbl.4.
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enacted?317 When courts vacate awards so often as to invite
challenges, the promise of final and binding arbitration erodes.
Figure 1 conceptualizes this moral hazard problem. Box 1
diagrams the diversion of the litigation stream following Gilmer’s broad approval of mandatory arbitration. But Gilmer
failed to anticipate so much sore losing by employers, who are
shown in this study to profit by contesting “final and binding”
awards.
Consider the recent experience of DaimlerChrysler employees in Michigan.318 Consistent with Box 1 of Figure 1, the
company set up an employee dispute resolution program
(EDRP).319 As shown in Box 2, the employee submitted the dispute to the company’s arbitration forum.320 The arbitrator ruled
for the employee as demonstrated by Box 3.321 The award in
one of the DaimlerChrysler employee cases, DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Carson, ordered $450,000 in back pay and $915,214 in
front pay,322 but as Box 4 illustrates, the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the front-pay award.323
I suggest that DaimlerChrysler learned how to use Michigan’s courts to circumvent adverse employment awards—an
ironic result because the courts rewarded DaimlerChrysler for
defecting from the arbitration system that the company intended as a binding alternative to a trial.
Now consider DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Porter, a recent
Michigan appellate decision that affirmed the trial court’s vacation of another arbitrator’s award in favor of an employee.324
Ernest Porter was terminated for falsifying his time records.325
Mr. Porter was subject to DaimlerChrysler’s EDRP (Box 1).326
Thus, his claim went to arbitration instead of to court (Box
317. See supra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (“[The FAA’s] purpose was to
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had
existed at English common law and had been adopted by American courts, and
to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”).
318. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Porter, No. 270112, 2006 WL
3019682 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Carson, No.
237315, 2003 WL 888043 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2003).
319. Porter, 2006 WL 3019682, at *1.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 2003 WL 888043, at *1.
323. Id. at *5.
324. Porter, 2006 WL 3019682, at *2–3.
325. Id. at *1.
326. Id.

LEROY_mlr

1052

3/15/2009 5:49 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:998

2).327 The arbitrator found that the company treated Mr. Porter
differently from co-workers and had no cause to fire him (Box
3).328 But the lower court vacated the award, reasoning that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority by ignoring relevant law, and
its decision was affirmed on appeal (Box 4).329
This brief discussion shows that DaimlerChrsyler avoided
two trials, nullified all or most of two adverse awards, and incurred very limited liability for its wrongdoing as found in two
Gilmer forum substitutes (Box 5). These courts nullified the
judgments of arbitrators who, as surrogate judges, ordered
damages for employees. The workers continued to be denied
access to trials. They were left with no meaningful recourse after this lengthy process. Their Gilmer forum substitute was an
empty promise.
Federal courts are not part of the problem. District and appellate courts behaved the same. Respectively, they confirmed
92.5%330 and 84.3%331 of challenged awards, whether individuals or employers prevailed in the arbitration. Compared to other appellate benchmarks that I describe in Part VI.B, federal
district courts used “extreme deference,”332 and federal appeals
courts exercised “great deference.”333
But state courts violated the FAA’s policy of ensuring finality of awards. In first-round challenges, state judges enforced
only 77.6% of employee-favorable awards.334 Compared to
benchmarks of other courts that exercised first-level review of
adjudicatory rulings, state judges barely fell into the intermediate category of “high deference.”335 Far worse, state appellate
judges were indifferent to the norm of award finality, vacating
about half (56.4%) of the awards that ruled in favor of employees.336 Comparative research puts this level in the “no deference” category.337

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *2–3.
See supra tbl.1.
See supra tbl.3.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
See supra tbl.2.
See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
See supra tbl.4.
See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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B. TOWARD A SOLUTION: POLICIES TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD
A solution is needed for the growing “moral hazard” problem of employer avoidance of public and private forums that
would otherwise hold them liable for wrongful conduct. This
study shows that arbitration is saddled with ever-expanding
grounds to overturn an award. Ostensibly, each new ground intends to improve arbitration. But with each safeguard, courts
weaken the legal backing for promises to arbitrate a dispute.
The current award-review regime does not serve its intended purposes. My Article concludes with two policy proposals that attempt to reduce moral hazard by creating stronger
barriers to vacating awards.
1. Return to the Simplicity of the FAA’s Extremely Narrow
Standards for Vacating Awards.
My empirical analysis shows that courts apply a hodgepodge of standards to review awards—including judicial tests
from the FAA, UAA, RUAA, Steelworkers Trilogy, and common
law. One possibility is to reenact the FAA with its original § 10
award review standards—with the new wrinkle of a broad and
explicit preemption clause that displaces all state arbitration
reviewing standards.
The FAA was enacted with no preemption clause. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has remarked that “The Arbitration Act is
something of an anomaly in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing
and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet
it does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction . . . .”338
The findings in this Article cast a troubling light on the
mysterious relationship between state and federal courts as
they co-administer the FAA. Congress should adopt a preemption clause for the FAA’s § 10 reviewing standards and create
exclusive jurisdiction in federal courts for award appeals.
Preemption language from the Employee Retirement and Security Act (ERISA) would provide an appropriate model to ensure
the supremacy of federal vacatur standards.339

338. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25
n.32 (1983).
339. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (providing that the statute shall “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan”).
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The data suggest that this approach would reduce the
moral hazard problem by eliminating the growing underbrush
of state regulation of arbitration. The findings in this study
show that when federal courts review awards, vacatur rates in
district and appellate courts average about ten percent, with
little difference in outcomes for pro-employee or pro-employer
awards. Moreover, current pronouncements by the Supreme
Court—including decisions in the 2008 term—show a marked
trend toward eclipsing a patchwork of state regulations in
fields where federal laws have been enacted.340 Indeed, the gist
of my legislative proposal was supported in the current term,
when the Court stated in Preston v. Ferrer that “The [FAA],
which rests on Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause, supplies not simply a procedural framework applicable
in federal courts; it also calls for the application, in state as
well as federal courts, of federal substantive law regarding arbitration.”341
2. Compel Employers to Pay Up Front When They Seek to
Vacate Awards.
While arbitration is a substitute for courts, private and
public tribunals have different powers to execute their judgments. Awards depend on voluntary compliance for their execution. Otherwise, a winning party must sue on the award to secure a compulsory order. In contrast, a party who prevails in a
state civil trial may be able to secure immediate relief—prior to
any appeal taken by the loser—to secure compliance with the
judgment. In other words, a party who loses at trial may be required to pay immediately.
Consider Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.342 After Pennzoil
reached an agreement to purchase Getty Oil Co., Texaco upset
the deal by topping Pennzoil’s purchase price.343 Pennzoil sued

340. See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 128 S. Ct. 989, 996 (2008)
(“And to interpret the federal law to permit [a special checking system for carriers], and similar, state requirements could easily lead to a patchwork of
state service-determining laws, rules, and regulations.”); see also Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (“State tort law that requires a
manufacturer’s catheters to be safer, but hence less effective, than the model
the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect.”).
341. 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008).
342. 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
343. Id. at 4.
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in state court, claiming tortious breach of contract.344 A jury
ruled for Pennzoil, finding actual damages of $7.53 billion and
punitive damages of $3 billion.345 Under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 346(b), Texaco was required to post a $13 billion
judgment bond as a condition for appealing the ruling.346 Moreover, under the lien and bond provisions of Texas law, Pennzoil
had a right to commence enforcement of its judgment on the
verdict before Texaco resolved its appeals.347 These postjudgment laws immediately cost Texaco; quickly, its stock fell,
and the firm had credit and bond-rating problems.348
Compare Pennzoil to Castleman v. AFC Enterprises, Inc.,
another Texas case.349 After removal to federal court, Castleman and the AFC franchisee agreed to submit the fast-food
worker’s claims to arbitration, and she was awarded
$1,678,622.40 in damages.350 The employer appealed and lost
its motion to vacate the award.351
Nonetheless, the case shows how the vacatur process can
contribute to moral hazard. AFC Enterprises had a cost-free
appeal, while Texaco encountered immediate problems due to
an adverse court judgment. If, as a matter of law, winners and
losers in arbitration were treated like judgment creditors and
debtors, arbitration losers would feel an immediate consequence for conduct that created liability. An arbitration-review
law patterned on Texas’ Rule of Civil Procedure 364(b) would
immediately cost an award loser for appealing the private order. Vacatur would become a costly bet by the award loser. In
the AFC Enterprises example, the employer would recoup its
bond only if its appeal had merit.
The point is that an award with up-front costs for making a
challenge would strengthen award finality. This would address
the “no bites at the apple” phenomenon. It would also strengthen forum substitution by treating a loser’s challenge to an
arbitrator’s award and a loser’s appeal of a court judgment
identically. The current practice, in contrast, allows employers
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 5; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 364(b) (repealed 1986) (current version
at TEX. R. APP. P. 24).
347. Pennzoil Co.,481 U.S. at 4–5.
348. Id. at 5.
349. 995 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
350. Id. at 651.
351. Id. at 651, 654.
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to make a cost-free appeal. This buys time and either postpones
or reverses judgment. As a result, award finality erodes.
CONCLUSION
Earlier, I posed a quandary surrounding an employer’s
successful challenge to an award that was ostensibly meant to
be final and binding. Because the employer had also inserted a
clause for expanded review of the award, the employer took a
second bite at the apple—and eventually prevailed. The employee was denied a trial, as well as her victory at an arbitration that she initially resisted. I suggested that this protracted
process created moral hazard because the employer used court
review of an award to avoid the consequences of violating the
rights of its employee.
Consider, now, the bigger picture that frames my moral
hazard thesis. Arbitration offers reduced cost, simplicity, and
easy accessibility to disputants. But after Gilmer, the process
was derided because of concerns that employees would not be
treated fairly. Statistical evidence in this study shows, however, that employees win all or part of their claims in nearly fifty
percent of arbitrations. But the benefits of employment arbitration will not be achieved until the growing vacatur problem—
and its attendant quality of “re-arbitrating” disputes that were
meant for final and binding resolution—is addressed. As courts
increasingly vacate awards in employees’ favor, the individual
must either engage in costly “do over” arbitration or be stuck
with a useless award because Gilmer bars employees from
suing.
This type of court interference is contrary to the intent of
the FAA. When Congress enacted the FAA, it built a simple
structure to house arbitration and insulate awards from the
harsh winds of judicial interference. The “house” was renovated
in 1955, with adoption of the UAA, and it was remodeled again
with the RUAA in 2000. On a smaller scale, courts have also
built upon the modest shelter that Congress created for arbitration awards in 1925. I argue that this simple home is now
creaking under weighty additions that overburden the core
FAA structure. Until Congress undertakes a systematic effort
to fix this leaning structure, by coordinating and simplifying
award review, the FAA’s “home” for arbitration awards in § 10
will begin to topple on itself. Meanwhile, courts are creating
moral hazard by tempting employers to avoid the consequences

LEROY_mlr

2009]

3/15/2009 5:49 PM

EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN ARBITRATIONS

1057

of their unlawful actions and renege on their contractual promise to resolve disputes in final and binding arbitration.
In this Article’s exploration of answer four to the quandary
I posed in the Introduction, I examined the implications of this
finding of moral hazard, concluding that the current award
structure does not serve its goals and that two public policy solutions offer the best chance of remedying a failing arbitral regime.

